November 12, 2026

hackergotchi for GreenboneOS

GreenboneOS

sshhole (CVE-2026-123158): The Exploited OpenSSH Flaw That Opens Password-Less Accounts

CVSS 8.1 · HighEPSS 16.5% (97th)Actively exploitedIn CISA KEVPublic PoC On November 5, 2026, the OpenSSH project shipped OpenSSH 10.6p2 to close a password authentication bypass in sshd. The flaw, tracked as CVE-2026-123158 and nicknamed “sshhole”, affects Linux systems that use the musl C library with PAM disabled, Alpine Linux being the best-known example. Under […]

12 November, 2026 01:21PM by Greenbone AG

November 11, 2026

hackergotchi for Tails

Tails

Tails 7.17

Changes and updates

  • Update Tor Browser to 16.0.1.

  • Update the Tor client to 0.4.9.16.

  • Update the Linux kernel to 6.12.116.

Get Tails 7.17

To upgrade your Tails USB stick and keep your Persistent Storage

  • Automatic upgrades are available from Tails 7.0 or later to 7.17.

  • If you cannot do an automatic upgrade or if Tails fails to start after an automatic upgrade, please try to do a manual upgrade.

To install Tails 7.17 on a new USB stick

Follow our installation instructions.

The Persistent Storage on the USB stick will be lost if you install instead of upgrading.

To download only

If you don't need installation or upgrade instructions, you can download Tails 7.17 directly:

11 November, 2026 12:00PM

hackergotchi for VyOS

VyOS

EVPN-VXLAN with Distributed Anycast Gateway on VyOS

Modern data center fabrics commonly combine BGP EVPN as the control plane with VXLAN as the data plane. In this architecture, a distributed anycast gateway places Layer 3 gateway functionality directly on multiple leaf switches (VTEPs), bringing routing closer to connected workloads.

This post summarizes how VyOS implements the anycast gateway, how traffic moves through the fabric, and why the model matters for workload mobility. For the complete configuration and validation steps, see the EVPN-VXLAN Anycast Gateway Deployment Guide.

11 November, 2026 10:09AM by Fernando Maidana (f.maidana@vyos.io)

hackergotchi for Deepin

Deepin

deepin 25.3.0 Release Note

deepin 25.3.0 is here! This release delivers a comprehensive upgrade across three core areas: system stability and performance, experience and intelligence, and ecosystem and compatibility. From freeze protection and faster startup for Control Center and everyday applications, to UOS AI's whole-disk knowledge base and multi-agent orchestration, to the default inclusion of PC Manager, kernel updates, and coordinated support for GPU acceleration and Linyaps containers — this release further improves deepin for daily use, intelligent experiences, application compatibility, and system maintenance. Release Highlights at a Glance UOS AI gets a major upgrade: system-level intelligence for the Agent OS, within easy reach. ...Read more

11 November, 2026 06:27AM by xiaofei

November 10, 2026

hackergotchi for Qubes

Qubes

XSAs released on 2026-11-10

The Xen Project has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs). The security of Qubes OS is affected.

XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS

The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS:

XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS

The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary:

  • XSA-529: Qubes OS does not use XAPI.
  • XSA-530: Qubes OS does not use XAPI.
  • XSA-531: Denial of service only.

XSAs that are still under investigation

The Qubes security team is still analyzing the security implications of the following XSA:

Once the status of this XSA has been determined, we will update this announcement and the XSA tracker.

About this announcement

Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor as part of its architecture. When the Xen Project publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only positive confirmation that certain XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide negative confirmation that other XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker, which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.

10 November, 2026 12:00AM

QSB-123: AMD CPU vulnerabilities (XSA-524, XSA-525)

We have published Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) 123: AMD CPU vulnerabilities (XSA-524, XSA-525). The text of this QSB and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below, followed by a general explanation of this announcement and authentication instructions.

Qubes Security Bulletin 123


             ---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 123 ]===---

                              2026-11-10

              AMD CPU vulnerabilities (XSA-524, XSA-525)

User action
------------

Continue to update normally via the Qubes Update tool or its
command-line equivalents [1] in order to apply the security updates
described in the "Patching" section below.

Summary
--------

On 2026-11-10, the Xen Project published the security advisories below.

XSA-524 [5] "AMD IOMMU Out-of-Bounds Device Table Read":

| With AMD IOMMUs, the OS or Hypervisor chooses the position and size of
| the Device Table, which holds the main configuration information for
| devices.
|
| AMD have disclosed a vulnerability in some IOMMUs, whereby under
| specific circumstances they read beyond the size chosen by the OS or
| Hypervisor.  This gets interpreted as valid configuration data for
| certain devices.
|
| For more information, see:
|   https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-3060.html

XSA-525 [6] "x86: Transient Scheduler Attacks (update)":

| AMD have discovered further properties of Transient Scheduler Attacks.
|
| The previously published XSA-471 dealt with two TSA variants, TSA-SQ
| and TSA-L1 on Zen3 and Zen4 CPUs.  For details, see XSA-471.
|
| AMD had previously said that Zen5 CPUs were not vulnerable to TSA-SQ and
| TSA-L1.  This statement has been corrected, and is being tracked as
| AMD-SB-7073 using the existing CVE-2024-36350 and CVE-2024-36357.
|
| AMD have also disclosed a new TSA variant, TSA-Fill, which is being
| tracked as AMD-SB-3031 and CVE-2026-0004.
|
| For more information, see:
|   https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-471.html
|   https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/resources/bulletin/technical-guidance-for-mitigating-transient-scheduler-attacks.pdf
|   https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-7073.html
|   https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-3031.html

Impact
-------

XSA-524: On affected systems, a malicious qube may be able to compromise
Qubes OS by writing to arbitrary memory pages.

XSA-525: On affected systems, a malicious qube may be able to leak data
from other qubes in the system.

Affected systems
-----------------

XSA-524: Some AMD EPYC CPUs are affected (see AMD-SB-3060 [7] for
details). Only systems with a specific device configuration are affected
(see XSA-524 [5] for details).

XSA-525: AMD Zen 5 CPUs are affected.

In both cases, Intel CPUs are not affected.

Patching
---------

The following packages contain security updates that address the
vulnerabilities described in this bulletin:

  For Qubes 4.3, in dom0:
  - Xen packages, 4.19.6-4

These packages will migrate from the security-testing repositories to
the current (stable) repositories after being tested by the community.
This testing period is intended to catch bugs affecting Qubes OS
stability before the packages reach the broader userbase. By default,
the security-testing repositories are disabled in both dom0 and
templates. If you wish to receive security updates faster at the risk of
encountering more bugs, you can enable the security-testing repositories
either temporarily (for a single update) or permanently. [2] Dom0,
templates, and standalones each have their own security-testing
repositories, which can be enabled independently of one another. [3][4]
If you do not have the relevant security-testing repositories enabled
while security updates are in security-testing, you must wait until they
migrate to the current (stable) repositories, which generally takes one
to two weeks but may be expedited in urgent cases. Once the packages are
available to your Qubes OS system, you should install them as described
in the "User action" section above.

After you have installed the packages listed above, you must restart
dom0 in order for the security updates to take effect.

If you use Anti Evil Maid, you must reseal your secret passphrase to new
PCR values, as PCR18+19 changes when Xen binaries are updated.

Credits
--------

See the original Xen Security Advisories. [5][6]

References
-----------

[1] https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/how-to-guides/how-to-update.html
[2] https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/downloading-installing-upgrading/testing.html#updates
[3] https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/advanced-topics/how-to-install-software-in-dom0.html#testing-repositories
[4] https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/how-to-guides/how-to-install-software.html#testing-repositories
[5] https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-524.html
[6] https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-525.html
[7] https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-3060.html

--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/

Source: qsb-123-2026.txt

Marek Marczykowski-Górecki’s PGP signature

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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=SJ9n
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Source: qsb-123-2026.txt.sig.marmarek

Simon Gaiser (aka HW42)’s PGP signature

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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=w665
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Source: qsb-123-2026.txt.sig.simon

What is the purpose of this announcement?

The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes security bulletin (QSB) has been published.

What is a Qubes security bulletin (QSB)?

A Qubes security bulletin (QSB) is a security announcement issued by the Qubes security team. A QSB typically provides a summary and impact analysis of one or more recently-discovered software vulnerabilities, including details about patching to address them.

Why should I care about QSBs?

QSBs tell you what actions you must take in order to protect yourself from recently-discovered security vulnerabilities. In most cases, security vulnerabilities are addressed by updating normally. However, in some cases, special user action is required. In all cases, the required actions are detailed in QSBs.

What are the PGP signatures that accompany QSBs?

A PGP signature is a cryptographic digital signature made in accordance with the OpenPGP standard. PGP signatures can be cryptographically verified with programs like GNU Privacy Guard (GPG). The Qubes security team cryptographically signs all QSBs so that Qubes users have a reliable way to check whether QSBs are genuine. The only way to be certain that a QSB is authentic is by verifying its PGP signatures.

Why should I care whether a QSB is authentic?

A forged QSB could deceive you into taking actions that adversely affect the security of your Qubes OS system, such as installing malware or making configuration changes that render your system vulnerable to attack. Falsified QSBs could sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the security of Qubes OS or the status of the Qubes OS Project.

How do I verify the PGP signatures on a QSB?

The following command-line instructions assume a Linux system with git and gpg installed. (For Windows and Mac options, see OpenPGP software.)

  1. Obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK), e.g.:

    $ gpg --fetch-keys https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc
    gpg: directory '/home/user/.gnupg' created
    gpg: keybox '/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx' created
    gpg: requesting key from 'https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc'
    gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created
    gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: public key "Qubes Master Signing Key" imported
    gpg: Total number processed: 1
    gpg:               imported: 1
    

    (For more ways to obtain the QMSK, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key.)

  2. View the fingerprint of the PGP key you just imported. (Note: gpg> indicates a prompt inside of the GnuPG program. Type what appears after it when prompted.)

    $ gpg --edit-key 0x427F11FD0FAA4B080123F01CDDFA1A3E36879494
    gpg (GnuPG) 2.2.27; Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
    This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
    There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
       
       
    pub  rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
         created: 2010-04-01  expires: never       usage: SC
         trust: unknown       validity: unknown
    [ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
       
    gpg> fpr
    pub   rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 2010-04-01 Qubes Master Signing Key
     Primary key fingerprint: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123  F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
    
  3. Important: At this point, you still don’t know whether the key you just imported is the genuine QMSK or a forgery. In order for this entire procedure to provide meaningful security benefits, you must authenticate the QMSK out-of-band. Do not skip this step! The standard method is to obtain the QMSK fingerprint from multiple independent sources in several different ways and check to see whether they match the key you just imported. For more information, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key.

    Tip: After you have authenticated the QMSK out-of-band to your satisfaction, record the QMSK fingerprint in a safe place (or several) so that you don’t have to repeat this step in the future.

  4. Once you are satisfied that you have the genuine QMSK, set its trust level to 5 (“ultimate”), then quit GnuPG with q.

    gpg> trust
    pub  rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
         created: 2010-04-01  expires: never       usage: SC
         trust: unknown       validity: unknown
    [ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
       
    Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users' keys
    (by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.)
       
      1 = I don't know or won't say
      2 = I do NOT trust
      3 = I trust marginally
      4 = I trust fully
      5 = I trust ultimately
      m = back to the main menu
       
    Your decision? 5
    Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y
       
    pub  rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
         created: 2010-04-01  expires: never       usage: SC
         trust: ultimate      validity: unknown
    [ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
    Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct
    unless you restart the program.
       
    gpg> q
    
  5. Use Git to clone the qubes-secpack repo.

    $ git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git
    Cloning into 'qubes-secpack'...
    remote: Enumerating objects: 4065, done.
    remote: Counting objects: 100% (1474/1474), done.
    remote: Compressing objects: 100% (742/742), done.
    remote: Total 4065 (delta 743), reused 1413 (delta 731), pack-reused 2591
    Receiving objects: 100% (4065/4065), 1.64 MiB | 2.53 MiB/s, done.
    Resolving deltas: 100% (1910/1910), done.
    
  6. Import the included PGP keys. (See our PGP key policies for important information about these keys.)

    $ gpg --import qubes-secpack/keys/*/*
    gpg: key 063938BA42CFA724: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
    gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/core-devs/retired: read error: Is a directory
    gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
    gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
    gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: public key "HW42 (Qubes Signing Key)" imported
    gpg: key DA0434BC706E1FCF: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
    gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: 2 signatures not checked due to missing keys
    gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: public key "Andrew David Wong (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
    gpg: key AAA743B42FBC07A9: public key "Brennan Novak (Qubes Website & Documentation Signing)" imported
    gpg: key B6A0BB95CA74A5C3: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
    gpg: key F32894BE9684938A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
    gpg: key 6E7A27B909DAFB92: public key "Hakisho Nukama (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
    gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
    gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: public key "Sven Semmler (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
    gpg: key BB52274595B71262: public key "unman (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
    gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
    gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: public key "Wojtek Porczyk (Qubes OS documentation signing key)" imported
    gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
    gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: public key "Zrubi (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
    gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: "Qubes Master Signing Key" not changed
    gpg: key 1848792F9E2795E9: public key "Qubes OS Release 4 Signing Key" imported
    gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/release-keys/retired: read error: Is a directory
    gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
    gpg: key D655A4F21830E06A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" imported
    gpg: key ACC2602F3F48CB21: public key "Qubes OS Security Team" imported
    gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/security-team/retired: read error: Is a directory
    gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
    gpg: key 4AC18DE1112E1490: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" imported
    gpg: Total number processed: 17
    gpg:               imported: 16
    gpg:              unchanged: 1
    gpg: marginals needed: 3  completes needed: 1  trust model: pgp
    gpg: depth: 0  valid:   1  signed:   6  trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u
    gpg: depth: 1  valid:   6  signed:   0  trust: 6-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u
    
  7. Verify signed Git tags.

    $ cd qubes-secpack/
    $ git tag -v `git describe`
    object 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
    type commit
    tag marmarek_sec_266e14a6
    tagger Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 1677757924 +0100
       
    Tag for commit 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
    gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:52:04 AM PST
    gpg:                using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
    gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
    

    The exact output will differ, but the final line should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key. The [full] indicates full trust, which this key inherits in virtue of being validly signed by the QMSK.

  8. Verify PGP signatures, e.g.:

    $ cd QSBs/
    $ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-087-2022.txt
    gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 04:05:51 AM PST
    gpg:                using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
    gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
    $ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.simon qsb-087-2022.txt
    gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 03:50:42 AM PST
    gpg:                using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
    gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
    $ cd ../canaries/
    $ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.marmarek canary-034-2023.txt
    gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:51:48 AM PST
    gpg:                using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
    gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
    $ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.simon canary-034-2023.txt
    gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 01:47:52 AM PST
    gpg:                using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
    gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
    

    Again, the exact output will differ, but the final line of output from each gpg --verify command should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key.

For this announcement (QSB-123), the commands are:

$ gpg --verify qsb-123-2026.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-123-2026.txt
$ gpg --verify qsb-123-2026.txt.sig.simon qsb-123-2026.txt

You can also verify the signatures directly from this announcement in addition to or instead of verifying the files from the qubes-secpack. Simply copy and paste the QSB-123 text into a plain text file and do the same for both signature files. Then, perform the same authentication steps as listed above, substituting the filenames above with the names of the files you just created.

10 November, 2026 12:00AM

November 09, 2026

hackergotchi for ARMBIAN

ARMBIAN

Github Highlights

Github Highlights

This cycle is defined by the launch of the armbian/external packaging pipeline, broad kernel and U-Boot version bumps across platforms, and substantial desktop and repository infrastructure work.

The new armbian/external repository establishes a dedicated build and mirror pipeline for third-party software, with tooling for dependency checks, parallel sync, incremental uploads, and a package site published at external.armbian.com. Initial payloads include charsiu for the RK3576 NPU, developer tools such as claude-code, codex, grok-cli, Zed, and a GitHub CLI build for riscv64, alongside a full Armbian Hyprland shell derived from the Omarchy port with companion packages for snapper snapshots, encrypted-root first boot, and Hyprland 0.57.0 titlebars. A new update-manager for Armbian has also been built and promoted to stable.

Kernel and bootloader work advanced across the lineup: edge kernels moved to 7.3.1 for qcs6490, qrb2210, sc8280xp, and mvebu, while the imx8m family moved to 7.3 and rockchip64 bleedingedge advanced to 7.4-rc1. Mainline U-Boot v2026.10 landed on Orange Pi 5, NanoPi M5, Mekotronics R58-4x4, Banana Pi M2, and Youyeetoo YY3588/R1. Platform fixes include RK3588 vendor-next CPU frequency scaling, RK356x HDMI fractional PLL and HDMI 2.0 scrambling for 4K@60, Rockchip64 runtime PM backports for 6.18, SpacemiT K1 fixes for the JPU driver and U-Boot vprintf overflow, and new board support for Torder R10D, Orange Pi A31s, DEBIX Model A, and Orange Pi 5 Ultra WiFi. Security coverage expanded with per-run kernel CVE patch selection in CI and Claude-assisted backports for 6.1 and 6.12.

On the desktop and repository side, Hyprland was added as a supported desktop with tiered package lists and a dedicated forky/sid x86 image, KDE Plasma gained persistent branding and Discover integration, and GNOME received Numix icons, a Ptyxis-based dock, and an Armbian wallpaper on the GDM login screen. The repository update workflow was rebuilt to separate incoming, beta, and stable flows, publish from configuration files, coordinate copies with live CI uploads, and consume external packages from the new pipeline. Imager received Windows flash fixes and AppImage repacking cleanup, and armbian-install gained btrfs @ subvolume creation, SPI image selection by install target, and UFS rootfs handling.

#armbian #embeddedlinux #rockchip #uboot #hyprland

Changes

09 November, 2026 11:55PM by Michael Robinson

hackergotchi for VyOS

VyOS

VyOS 1.5.1-S1 and 1.4.5-S1 released: security fixes in the Linux kernel and FRR

Hello, Community!

VyOS 1.5.1-S1 and VyOS 1.4.5-S1 are available, and subscribers can download images from the Support Portal.

Both are security releases. They replace VyOS 1.5.1 and VyOS 1.4.5 and contain only security fixes: two in the Linux kernel for both versions, and three more in FRR for 1.5.1-S1. If you run VyOS 1.5.1 or 1.4.5 or older, upgrade promptly.

09 November, 2026 06:16PM by Daniil Baturin (daniil@sentrium.io)

hackergotchi for Deepin

Deepin

November 08, 2026

hackergotchi for SparkyLinux

SparkyLinux

SparkyOS on USB 2026.11 (Debian)

The new release is based on the SparkyLinux/Debian testing, and provide separated IMG images for UEFI and BIOS machines. SparkyOS is a modern, portable, rolling Linux-based operating system, derived from various Linux distributions, designed for modern 64-bit computers and laptops. This release provides ready to launch system images based on Debian testing. More on the project page…

Source

08 November, 2026 11:23AM by pavroo

hackergotchi for Qubes

Qubes

XSAs released on 2026-11-06

The Xen Project has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs). The security of Qubes OS is not affected.

XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS

The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS:

  • (none)

XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS

The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary:

About this announcement

Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor as part of its architecture. When the Xen Project publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only positive confirmation that certain XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide negative confirmation that other XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker, which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.

08 November, 2026 12:00AM

November 06, 2026

hackergotchi for ZEVENET

ZEVENET

Finding Vulnerabilities Is Getting Faster. Keeping Systems Secure Takes Continuous Engineering.

Artificial intelligence is changing how software vulnerabilities are discovered. Security researchers can now identify flaws in complex codebases that might otherwise take considerably longer to detect, giving developers an opportunity to address weaknesses before they are exploited.

In January 2026, AI-powered security research company AISLE identified all 12 vulnerabilities addressed in an OpenSSL security release, including flaws in code that had remained undetected for years. The findings were validated by researchers and disclosed to the OpenSSL project, which coordinated the necessary fixes.

The case illustrates what AI-assisted vulnerability discovery can achieve. But finding a vulnerability does not automatically make a system more secure. It takes engineering expertise to turn that discovery into a tested solution that ultimately reaches production systems.

That work does not end when software is deployed. It continues throughout the product’s lifecycle.

From Vulnerability Discovery to Security Updates

A vulnerability can be discovered by a security researcher, an automated scanning tool, a customer reporting unexpected behavior or an AI-powered system. Whatever the source, identifying the problem is only the beginning.

Engineers first need to establish whether the issue is reproducible, which components and versions are affected, and what consequences it could have. They must then develop a correction and test it against existing functionality.

This validation is particularly important for infrastructure software. A security fix that introduces instability into a load balancer, for example, could affect the applications and services that depend on it.

Once the correction is ready, it must be included in a release, documented and made available to users. The organization operating the software then needs to assess and deploy the update.

Security updates close known vulnerabilities only when the corresponding fixes are applied to the affected systems. Until then, the infrastructure may remain exposed, even if the vendor has already resolved the issue.

The Engineering Work Behind Every Release

Software updates are often perceived as downloadable files or notifications announcing a new version. What users rarely see is the work required to produce them.

At SKUDONET, maintaining the platform involves three specialized areas working together: security engineering, core development, and penetration testing and quality assurance. Each contributes to the continuous effort required to keep the software secure, reliable and capable of meeting evolving infrastructure requirements.

Security Engineering: Monitoring Vulnerabilities and Developing Mitigations

New Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) are regularly disclosed across operating systems, network stacks, cryptographic libraries and other software components.

SKUDONET’s security engineers continuously monitor CVE feeds and security advisories to identify issues that could affect the platform or the applications it protects.

When a vulnerability affects SKUDONET, engineers investigate its impact, develop and validate a correction, and prepare the corresponding security update.

In other situations, particularly when an upstream patch is not yet available or a vulnerability affects an application behind the ADC, the team may develop additional mitigation measures, such as targeted Web Application Firewall (WAF) rules.

These measures can help reduce exposure to known attack vectors while the underlying vulnerability is being addressed.

Core Development: Stability and Product Evolution

Development teams also investigate reported problems, refine traffic-distribution algorithms, improve existing functionality and introduce new capabilities.

For an Application Delivery Controller (ADC), this work spans components responsible for traffic distribution, high availability, TLS processing and application security.

A recent example is SKUDONET Enterprise Edition 10.4.0, which introduced new capabilities for managing network traffic as part of the platform’s ongoing development. Releases like this reflect the work of engineers to evolve the product, maintain its reliability and respond to changing infrastructure requirements.

Penetration Testing and Quality Assurance: Validating Changes Before Release

Developing a correction or a new feature is only part of the process. Before changes reach customers, they must be evaluated to ensure they behave as intended and do not compromise existing functionality.

SKUDONET’s penetration testing and quality assurance teams carry out functional and security testing, performance assessments and stress tests under demanding conditions.

These activities include evaluating high traffic loads, simulated DDoS scenarios, unusual network behavior and potential exploitation attempts.

The objective is to identify weaknesses before deployment and verify that updates preserve the stability, throughput and performance expected from infrastructure responsible for delivering critical applications.

This validation is particularly important when changes affect components operating directly in the flow of production traffic.

Why Direct Access to Engineers Matters

Maintaining a product involves more than publishing new versions. Technical questions and incidents continue to arise as customers adapt their infrastructure, change configurations or encounter unexpected behavior.

When a critical service experiences a problem, response time matters. But so does the expertise of the person handling the incident.

In support structures where requests pass through several departments or escalation levels, valuable time can be spent transferring information before the issue reaches someone with the necessary technical knowledge.

Direct communication with engineers who develop and maintain the product can reduce those intermediate steps. The people investigating the problem already understand the software’s architecture, its components and the technical context behind its behavior.

At SKUDONET, customers with technical support coverage communicate directly with the company’s specialized engineering team. Depending on the contracted service level, assistance can range from ticket-based troubleshooting to remote technical sessions and direct intervention during critical incidents.

A recent example is the response to PHP2Shell, two critical PHP vulnerabilities disclosed in October 2026. Although SKUDONET itself was not directly affected by these vulnerabilities, PHP applications operating behind its load balancer could be exposed.

SKUDONET’s engineering team prepared a WAF ruleset designed to help mitigate known exploitation patterns while customers applied the official PHP security patches.

The ruleset was not a substitute for correcting PHP itself. It provided an additional mitigation measure during the period in which affected applications were being updated.

The technical details are explained in Critical PHP Vulnerabilities: How SKUDONET WAF Helps Mitigate PHP2Shell Attacks.

Cases like this demonstrate why the relationship between software maintenance and technical support matters: responding to an emerging threat can require both product knowledge and the ability to provide practical assistance to customers.

Why Software Security Updates Matter for Critical Infrastructure

An ADC occupies a sensitive position in an organization’s infrastructure. It manages connections between users and applications and may also enforce security policies through capabilities such as a Web Application Firewall.

Its availability can directly affect the services operating behind it.

An outdated ADC does not necessarily become vulnerable immediately. However, when new weaknesses are discovered and corrected, systems that do not receive the corresponding updates may continue running with known security issues.

The consequences depend on the vulnerability and the configuration involved. They can range from unexpected service behavior and availability problems to more serious security exposure.

As AI-assisted tools make vulnerability discovery and analysis faster, attackers may also use these capabilities to identify weaknesses in exposed infrastructure. This adds further pressure on organizations to keep security updates current and reduce the time between the release of a fix and its deployment.

This makes regular maintenance an operational responsibility, not simply a software administration task.

Organizations need to know which versions they are running, assess the relevance of new security advisories, test updates when necessary and establish a process for deploying them.

An active maintenance and support agreement helps preserve access to vendor updates and, where technical assistance is included, the expertise required to investigate complex incidents.

For organizations operating SKUDONET Enterprise Edition, all support plans guarantee access to the latest software updates, security patches, bug fixes, performance improvements, major upgrades, and standard and custom WAF mitigation rulesets throughout the contract period, regardless of the support tier selected.

The difference between support levels lies primarily in the assistance provided. Organizations with sufficient internal expertise may prioritize access to software updates and technical documentation, while those operating business-critical services may require direct engineering assistance, defined response times, remote troubleshooting sessions or 24/7 incident response.

The appropriate level depends on the infrastructure’s criticality, internal expertise and the consequences of a prolonged service interruption.

Keeping Protection Continuous

One aspect of infrastructure maintenance is easy to overlook: the continuity of the agreement that provides access to updates and assistance.

A perpetual software license does not necessarily include indefinite access to new releases or vendor support.

SKUDONET Enterprise Edition, for example, continues operating when its service plan expires. The software does not stop working or become automatically insecure on that date. However, the customer loses access to new versions, security updates and the services included in the expired contract.

The distinction matters. Existing functionality remains available, but newly identified vulnerabilities may no longer receive the corrections needed to address them.

Avoiding an interruption in maintenance coverage should therefore be part of routine infrastructure planning.

While support can be renewed annually, SKUDONET also offers multi-year agreements covering two, three or five years. These options allow organizations to lock in their support costs for the entire contract period, protecting them against inflation-related price increases and future pricing adjustments while reducing the administrative burden of annual renewals.

Longer-term coverage can also help maintain continuity in access to updates and technical resources, while supporting internal security governance and maintenance processes associated with frameworks such as NIS2, PCI DSS and ISO 27001.

At SKUDONET, renewal communications begin 67 days before a service contract expires, giving customers advance notice and time to renew without interrupting their coverage.

The objective is not simply to renew an administrative agreement. It is to prevent an avoidable gap in access to updates and technical resources.

Protecting critical infrastructure doesn’t end when a product is deployed. It’s an ongoing responsibility.

Frequently Asked Questions

Why are software security updates important?

Security updates address known vulnerabilities and may also include fixes that improve software stability. Applying relevant updates helps reduce exposure to security weaknesses and maintain reliable operation.

What is the difference between software maintenance and technical support?

Software maintenance involves correcting defects, addressing vulnerabilities and improving a product over time. Technical support helps users diagnose incidents, troubleshoot configurations and resolve problems encountered while operating the software.

What happens when an ADC support plan expires?

The consequences depend on the vendor’s licensing model. With SKUDONET Enterprise Edition, the software continues operating under its perpetual license, but access to new releases, security updates and contracted technical support ends when the service plan expires.

Do all SKUDONET support plans include software updates?

Yes. All SKUDONET Enterprise Edition support plans guarantee access to the latest software updates, security patches, bug fixes and major upgrades throughout the contract period. The level of technical assistance and incident response depends on the plan selected.

06 November, 2026 11:33AM by Isabel Perez

hackergotchi for Deepin

Deepin

Urgent Security Update | APT Download Verification Bypass — Please Update Now

Dear deepin users and community members, A vulnerability has been discovered in APT, the package manager, that allows package integrity verification to be bypassed. Under specific conditions, an attacker positioned on the network path can substitute a package of their own making for one that has already passed verification, and have it executed with root privileges. Since APT is the component through which every system update passes, the impact of exploitation would be substantial. All users are advised to update as soon as possible.   Vulnerability details CVE ID: CVE-2026-109518 Description: When following an HTTP redirect, APT can merge two ...Read more

06 November, 2026 07:20AM by xiaofei

hackergotchi for Qubes

Qubes

QSB-122: Package verification bypass in APT (DSA-6607-1)

We have published Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) 122: Package verification bypass in APT (DSA-6607-1). The text of this QSB and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below, followed by a general explanation of this announcement and authentication instructions.

Qubes Security Bulletin 122


             ---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 122 ]===---

                              2026-11-06

            Package verification bypass in APT (DSA-6607-1)

User action
------------

If you update Qubes OS using the Qubes Update tool, continue to update
normally in order to receive the security updates described in the
"Patching" section below.

If you update Qubes OS using command-line tools instead of the Qubes
Update tool, you must first update dom0 by itself (without any other
qubes) via `qubes-dom0-update` in a dom0 terminal. Only after dom0 has
been successfully updated should you update all Debian and Whonix
templates and standalones via `qubes-vm-update` in a dom0 terminal. (The
Qubes Update tool automatically handles updating in the correct order.)

Do not attempt to update any qube using the `apt` command directly, as
this bypasses built-in Qubes OS update security measures. Use only the
Qubes Update tool or its command-line equivalents in the order described
above. [1]

After updating dom0 and all Debian and Whonix templates and standalones,
we recommend restarting all Debian and Whonix qubes to ensure the
updates take effect.

Summary
--------

On 2026-11-04, the Debian security team published DSA 6607-1, "apt
security update" (CVE-2026-109518) [3]:
| Max Justicz discovered a vulnerability in the APT package manager. APT
| can merge two different package downloads after an HTTP redirect gives
| them the same URI. Improper file handling when resuming an HTTP
| download allows a man-in-the-middle attacker to replace a package
| after verification, resulting in the execution of arbitrary code as
| root.

Also see "APT-2026-11-01 security update." [4]

Impact
-------

An attacker who controls an update mirror or who can modify network
traffic can attempt to exploit this vulnerability in order to compromise
Debian and Whonix qubes.

Affected systems
-----------------

Qubes OS systems containing Debian and Whonix qubes are affected.

Qubes OS systems containing only Fedora (or other non-APT-based) qubes
are not affected.

Discussion
-----------

By default, the Advanced Package Tool (APT) verifies downloaded packages
via signed repository metadata. This allows for using package
repositories without having to trust the server hosting them or the
transport method used to download them. The vulnerability under
discussion breaks this mechanism. An attacker who successfully exploits
this vulnerability can manipulate the packages that APT downloads and
installs, potentially leading to complete compromise of the affected
qube. A successful attack requires one or more of the following:

 - The attacker controls the server on which the repository is hosted
   (e.g., a third-party mirror).

 - The transport mechanism is not authenticated (e.g., plain HTTP), and
   the attacker can tamper with the connection to the server.

 - An independent vulnerability allows the attacker to achieve one of
   the above (e.g., exploiting a bug in the server or compromising a
   trusted certificate authority (CA) or a digital certificate issued by
   such an authority).

In Qubes OS, Debian and Whonix qubes use HTTPS for APT repositories by
default, which eliminates the second (man-in-the-middle) attack vector.
(Users who have manually changed their configurations to use plain HTTP
for any repositories are still affected. Users who have manually
installed unofficial APT-based qubes besides Debian and Whonix are also
affected.)

Normally, we do not release Qubes security bulletins (QSBs) to address
vulnerabilities that affect qubes only internally without affecting the
rest of Qubes OS, since such vulnerabilities do not undermine the Qubes
security model. (On the contrary, the security model is built on the
assumption that such vulnerabilities are inevitable.)

However, the vulnerability under discussion is somewhat special. While
it affects qubes only internally, it could allow an attacker to
compromise templates, which are used as a basis for creating other
qubes, such as app and service qubes. If a template is compromised, then
all the qubes based on that template will also be compromised. App qubes
operate directly on user data, and service qubes can affect user privacy
(e.g., Whonix and VPN proxy qubes).

In Qubes OS, we take special precautions to make templates difficult to
compromise. For example, we block all network connections to and from
templates, with one exception: We allow templates to connect to an
"update proxy" that allows the template to retrieve updates while
protecting users from accidentally using templates to perform risky
activities, such as browsing the web.

Since the vulnerability under discussion has the potential to subvert
these defenses, and since we can address it via the Qubes update system,
we've decided to issue this QSB and its attendant security updates.

Patching
---------

The packages below contain security updates to the Qubes update tools
that address the vulnerability described in this bulletin. After these
updates are applied, the Qubes update tools will update APT in a safe
way.

  For Qubes 4.3, in dom0:
  - qubes-core-dom0-linux 4.3.25
  - qubes-mgmt-salt-dom0-update 4.3.4

These packages will migrate from the security-testing repository to the
current (stable) repository over the next two weeks after being tested
by the community. [2] Once available, the packages should be installed
as described in the "User action" section above.

Credits
--------

See the Debian and APT security advisories. [3][4]

References
-----------

[1] https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/how-to-guides/how-to-update.html
[2] https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/downloading-installing-upgrading/testing.html
[3] https://lists.debian.org/debian-security-announce/2026/msg00526.html
[4] https://lists.debian.org/deity/2026/11/msg00005.html

--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/

Source: qsb-122-2026.txt

Marek Marczykowski-Górecki’s PGP signature

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-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Source: qsb-122-2026.txt.sig.marmarek

Simon Gaiser (aka HW42)’s PGP signature

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Source: qsb-122-2026.txt.sig.simon

What is the purpose of this announcement?

The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes security bulletin (QSB) has been published.

What is a Qubes security bulletin (QSB)?

A Qubes security bulletin (QSB) is a security announcement issued by the Qubes security team. A QSB typically provides a summary and impact analysis of one or more recently-discovered software vulnerabilities, including details about patching to address them.

Why should I care about QSBs?

QSBs tell you what actions you must take in order to protect yourself from recently-discovered security vulnerabilities. In most cases, security vulnerabilities are addressed by updating normally. However, in some cases, special user action is required. In all cases, the required actions are detailed in QSBs.

What are the PGP signatures that accompany QSBs?

A PGP signature is a cryptographic digital signature made in accordance with the OpenPGP standard. PGP signatures can be cryptographically verified with programs like GNU Privacy Guard (GPG). The Qubes security team cryptographically signs all QSBs so that Qubes users have a reliable way to check whether QSBs are genuine. The only way to be certain that a QSB is authentic is by verifying its PGP signatures.

Why should I care whether a QSB is authentic?

A forged QSB could deceive you into taking actions that adversely affect the security of your Qubes OS system, such as installing malware or making configuration changes that render your system vulnerable to attack. Falsified QSBs could sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the security of Qubes OS or the status of the Qubes OS Project.

How do I verify the PGP signatures on a QSB?

The following command-line instructions assume a Linux system with git and gpg installed. (For Windows and Mac options, see OpenPGP software.)

  1. Obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK), e.g.:

    $ gpg --fetch-keys https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc
    gpg: directory '/home/user/.gnupg' created
    gpg: keybox '/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx' created
    gpg: requesting key from 'https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc'
    gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created
    gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: public key "Qubes Master Signing Key" imported
    gpg: Total number processed: 1
    gpg:               imported: 1
    

    (For more ways to obtain the QMSK, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key.)

  2. View the fingerprint of the PGP key you just imported. (Note: gpg> indicates a prompt inside of the GnuPG program. Type what appears after it when prompted.)

    $ gpg --edit-key 0x427F11FD0FAA4B080123F01CDDFA1A3E36879494
    gpg (GnuPG) 2.2.27; Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
    This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
    There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
       
       
    pub  rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
         created: 2010-04-01  expires: never       usage: SC
         trust: unknown       validity: unknown
    [ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
       
    gpg> fpr
    pub   rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 2010-04-01 Qubes Master Signing Key
     Primary key fingerprint: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123  F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
    
  3. Important: At this point, you still don’t know whether the key you just imported is the genuine QMSK or a forgery. In order for this entire procedure to provide meaningful security benefits, you must authenticate the QMSK out-of-band. Do not skip this step! The standard method is to obtain the QMSK fingerprint from multiple independent sources in several different ways and check to see whether they match the key you just imported. For more information, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key.

    Tip: After you have authenticated the QMSK out-of-band to your satisfaction, record the QMSK fingerprint in a safe place (or several) so that you don’t have to repeat this step in the future.

  4. Once you are satisfied that you have the genuine QMSK, set its trust level to 5 (“ultimate”), then quit GnuPG with q.

    gpg> trust
    pub  rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
         created: 2010-04-01  expires: never       usage: SC
         trust: unknown       validity: unknown
    [ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
       
    Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users' keys
    (by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.)
       
      1 = I don't know or won't say
      2 = I do NOT trust
      3 = I trust marginally
      4 = I trust fully
      5 = I trust ultimately
      m = back to the main menu
       
    Your decision? 5
    Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y
       
    pub  rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
         created: 2010-04-01  expires: never       usage: SC
         trust: ultimate      validity: unknown
    [ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
    Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct
    unless you restart the program.
       
    gpg> q
    
  5. Use Git to clone the qubes-secpack repo.

    $ git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git
    Cloning into 'qubes-secpack'...
    remote: Enumerating objects: 4065, done.
    remote: Counting objects: 100% (1474/1474), done.
    remote: Compressing objects: 100% (742/742), done.
    remote: Total 4065 (delta 743), reused 1413 (delta 731), pack-reused 2591
    Receiving objects: 100% (4065/4065), 1.64 MiB | 2.53 MiB/s, done.
    Resolving deltas: 100% (1910/1910), done.
    
  6. Import the included PGP keys. (See our PGP key policies for important information about these keys.)

    $ gpg --import qubes-secpack/keys/*/*
    gpg: key 063938BA42CFA724: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
    gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/core-devs/retired: read error: Is a directory
    gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
    gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
    gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: public key "HW42 (Qubes Signing Key)" imported
    gpg: key DA0434BC706E1FCF: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
    gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: 2 signatures not checked due to missing keys
    gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: public key "Andrew David Wong (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
    gpg: key AAA743B42FBC07A9: public key "Brennan Novak (Qubes Website & Documentation Signing)" imported
    gpg: key B6A0BB95CA74A5C3: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
    gpg: key F32894BE9684938A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
    gpg: key 6E7A27B909DAFB92: public key "Hakisho Nukama (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
    gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
    gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: public key "Sven Semmler (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
    gpg: key BB52274595B71262: public key "unman (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
    gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
    gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: public key "Wojtek Porczyk (Qubes OS documentation signing key)" imported
    gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
    gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: public key "Zrubi (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
    gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: "Qubes Master Signing Key" not changed
    gpg: key 1848792F9E2795E9: public key "Qubes OS Release 4 Signing Key" imported
    gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/release-keys/retired: read error: Is a directory
    gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
    gpg: key D655A4F21830E06A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" imported
    gpg: key ACC2602F3F48CB21: public key "Qubes OS Security Team" imported
    gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/security-team/retired: read error: Is a directory
    gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
    gpg: key 4AC18DE1112E1490: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" imported
    gpg: Total number processed: 17
    gpg:               imported: 16
    gpg:              unchanged: 1
    gpg: marginals needed: 3  completes needed: 1  trust model: pgp
    gpg: depth: 0  valid:   1  signed:   6  trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u
    gpg: depth: 1  valid:   6  signed:   0  trust: 6-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u
    
  7. Verify signed Git tags.

    $ cd qubes-secpack/
    $ git tag -v `git describe`
    object 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
    type commit
    tag marmarek_sec_266e14a6
    tagger Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 1677757924 +0100
       
    Tag for commit 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
    gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:52:04 AM PST
    gpg:                using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
    gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
    

    The exact output will differ, but the final line should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key. The [full] indicates full trust, which this key inherits in virtue of being validly signed by the QMSK.

  8. Verify PGP signatures, e.g.:

    $ cd QSBs/
    $ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-087-2022.txt
    gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 04:05:51 AM PST
    gpg:                using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
    gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
    $ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.simon qsb-087-2022.txt
    gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 03:50:42 AM PST
    gpg:                using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
    gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
    $ cd ../canaries/
    $ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.marmarek canary-034-2023.txt
    gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:51:48 AM PST
    gpg:                using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
    gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
    $ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.simon canary-034-2023.txt
    gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 01:47:52 AM PST
    gpg:                using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
    gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
    

    Again, the exact output will differ, but the final line of output from each gpg --verify command should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key.

For this announcement (QSB-122), the commands are:

$ gpg --verify qsb-122-2026.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-122-2026.txt
$ gpg --verify qsb-122-2026.txt.sig.simon qsb-122-2026.txt

You can also verify the signatures directly from this announcement in addition to or instead of verifying the files from the qubes-secpack. Simply copy and paste the QSB-122 text into a plain text file and do the same for both signature files. Then, perform the same authentication steps as listed above, substituting the filenames above with the names of the files you just created.

06 November, 2026 12:00AM

November 05, 2026

hackergotchi for GreenboneOS

GreenboneOS

Brotli, Cisco and Sophos: When Configuration Decides Exposure

Two newly exploited vulnerabilities lead this week’s security wrap-up: a flaw in the widely used Brotli decoder and a Cisco firewall issue affecting remote access VPNs. The OPENVAS ENTERPRISE FEED already includes checks for both, plus a new Sophos UTM check and broader product-specific PHP2Shell coverage. These updates help security teams find affected assets across […]

05 November, 2026 10:29AM by Greenbone AG

hackergotchi for Deepin

Deepin

October Community Monthly Report | deepin 25 Security Updates & Community 7.3 Kernel Early Access Release

October Community Data Overview Community Products deepin 25 Security Updates: sudo Privilege-Escalation Vulnerability & Certificate Trust Chain Repair In October, two urgent security updates were rolled out for deepin 25. On October 12, deepin 25 patched the sudo time-window authorisation-bypass vulnerability (CVE-2026-96512, CVSS 7.8). This vulnerability stemmed from a validation defect in sudo's handling of time-window rules within sudoers. When parsing timestamps, sudo reads the calling process's TZ environment variable. A local user could set the time zone to an extreme offset to shift time windows by up to approximately 25 hours. This caused expired or not-yet-effective rules to be incorrectly evaluated as valid, enabling privilege escalation to root outside the intended time period. On October 21, deepin 25 remediated flaws in intermediate CA private keys ...Read more

05 November, 2026 05:59AM by xiaofei

November 04, 2026

hackergotchi for ARMBIAN

ARMBIAN

Armbian 26.11 – Testing begins

Armbian 26.11 – Testing begins

The Armbian 26.11 release cycle is in its final stretch. November is for stabilizing: fixing regressions, building release images, and testing on as much supported hardware as we can.

Since Armbian 26.08, hundreds of contributions have improved the build framework, kernel support, installation tools, hardware compatibility and release automation. Now it’s time to bring it all together and get Armbian 26.11 ready to ship.

What’s coming in this release

Debian Trixie is now the build base. It’s the official build host and the default Docker image. Ubuntu Noble has been removed from release targets, and every image format is now signed.

U-Boot 2026.10 is in place on most platforms. The remaining integrations and boot validation are still in progress.

Linux 6.18 LTS is still our main kernel. Mainline development has reached Linux 7.2-rc7, and Rockchip edge is moving to 7.2 as well. Out-of-tree drivers have been updated to match.

Bootable UEFI live ISOs are now available in minimal and desktop variants, aimed at cloud and IPMI environments.

armbian-install has been rewritten as a tested armbian-config module. It brings better eMMC/NVMe installation, SPI/MTD boot with root on NVMe, SATA or USB, dual-boot diagnostics, and bootloader-only flashing.

New boards: LubanCat 4, Xiaomi Pad 6S Pro, NanoPi NEO3 Plus, Milk-V DuoS, Walnut Pi Box and Tanix TX6S. The Banana Pi R2 is back, too.

Promoted to Standard Support: RG DS, RG Vita Pro, LubanCat 5IO, Luckfox Nova and Qidi X-6.

GPU and UEFI: the reComputer RK3588 now uses the open Panthor GPU stack, and UEFI gains Qualcomm X1E and CIX mainline support.

Wireless: thousands of compiler warnings fixed in the rtl8852bs and uwe5622 drivers, along with memory-safety fixes.

armbian-config: Proxmox VE on Trixie, virt-manager, docker-buildx and overlayfs now work out of the box.

Release automation: weekly stable builds with automatic version bumps, pinned source SHAs, and a changelog page for every release.

All of this is the work of maintainers, developers, contributors and partners across the Armbian community, and it adds up to a lot.

Automated testing & AI-assisted development

We keep investing in Armbian’s automated testing and R&D facility. It regularly tests dozens of physical boards across different SoC families, checking that they boot reliably and that the kernel, networking and other hardware-specific features work. That way we catch regressions earlier, and maintainers spend less time on repetitive checks.

We’re also using AI-assisted development agents more and more in our engineering work. They help investigate failures, analyze regressions, handle routine maintenance and prepare fixes for developers to review. Together with testing on real hardware, this lets a small team cover more platforms.

You can see which boards the facility covers, and their latest results, on the Armbian Automated Board Testing Status page.

If your board is covered there, it usually doesn’t need extra manual release testing. The main exceptions are desktop functionality, which automation doesn’t cover yet, and any other features outside the automated tests. That means community testing can go where it helps most.

Stability first

With the release close, development is now focused on critical fixes, regressions and release-blocking issues. Our priorities are to:

  • Fix critical boot, kernel, networking and storage regressions.
  • Validate U-Boot 2026.10 and the updated kernel stacks.
  • Test new boards and boards recently promoted to Standard Support.
  • Check desktop images and graphics.
  • Finish generating release images and find any that are missing.
  • Move unfinished features and non-essential changes to the 27.02 development cycle.

If you’re contributing, please hold off on changes that aren’t needed right now, so we don’t destabilize the release.

Help us test

Community testing matters most for boards our facility doesn’t cover yet, and for desktop functionality. You don’t need to be a developer. If you own a supported board, a few basic checks really do help.

1. Check your board

Start with the Automated Board Testing Status page. If your board is covered and its tests are passing, you don’t need to repeat the basic boot and networking checks, but desktop and other features outside automated coverage still need a human. If your board isn’t covered, your testing is especially valuable.

2. Download and boot

Grab the latest 26.11 pre-release image for your board from Download Test Images. If a pre-release image is not available for your board, you can also use the latest nightly build. Testing and bug reports from both are equally welcome.

Flash it to a spare SD card or other storage, boot the board, and complete the initial setup. These are development images, so please don’t test them on production systems or on storage holding data you care about.

3. Run some basic checks

Focus on what matters for your hardware:

  • Boot: Does the board start reliably? Try a reboot and, if you can, a cold boot.
  • Networking: Check Ethernet, Wi-Fi and basic connectivity.
  • Storage: Test SD, eMMC, NVMe, SATA or USB storage, whichever your board has.
  • USB and peripherals: Check connected devices and any important board-specific interfaces.
  • Desktop: Check graphical login, display output, resolution, GPU acceleration and general usability.
  • Installation: If you can, try the rewritten armbian-install, especially installing to eMMC/NVMe and setting up the bootloader.

A quick look at the running system can also turn up unexpected errors:

uname -a
cat /etc/armbian-release
sudo dmesg -l err,crit,alert,emerg

You don’t have to test everything. Even confirming that a previously untested board boots and works is useful.

4. Report regressions

If something fails, please report it on the Armbian Community Forum and include:

  • The board model, and its hardware revision if you know it.
  • The exact image filename and kernel version.
  • What works, what fails, and how to reproduce the problem.
  • Whether the same thing worked on an earlier Armbian release.
  • Logs, ideally collected with armbianmonitor -u.

Please put critical failures and release-blocking regressions first. If you can fix an issue yourself, a pull request to Armbian Build is very welcome.

For developers

Maintainers can start generating release images under 26.11 by following Prepare Release Images. Generated images appear in the incoming release directory. To find images that haven’t been generated yet, check Reporting: Download Images.

For now, please stick to critical fixes and release-blocking regressions. Save refactoring and new features for later: unfinished work moves to the 27.02 development cycle.

Towards 26.11

Armbian keeps growing, and not just through new hardware and software. Better infrastructure, automated testing and smarter workflows cut down on repetitive maintenance, so developers have more time for the hard hardware problems and the improvements that matter.

But automation can’t replace the experience, knowledge and work of our community. Every board you test, every regression you report and every fix you send makes Armbian better.

Thank you to everyone who writes code, maintains hardware support, tests images, runs infrastructure or supports the project in any way.

Let’s get Armbian 26.11 ready for release!

The Armbian Team

04 November, 2026 10:44PM by Igor Pecovnik

hackergotchi for GreenboneOS

GreenboneOS

AI Security Without Losing Control: Deterministic Tests at AI Speed

At it-sa 2026 in Nuremberg, AI security came up in many of the conversations at our stand. Visitors weren’t asking for another chatbot to answer their questions. They wanted to know what AI can do for them in practice: what they would have to do, how, and how much effort it takes, how AI can […]

04 November, 2026 11:59AM by Greenbone AG

hackergotchi for ArcheOS

ArcheOS

USDA Soil Texture Triangle, an offline tool for geoarchaeology

Hi everyone,

In 2016 I wrote a post about geTexture, a small web application that Giuseppe Naponiello developed for us to read the USDA Soil Texture Triangle during excavations. That tool was in Italian and needed a browser connected to a server. In the last few days I have come back to the same problem with a different approach: a single HTML page that works completely offline.

The result is USDA Soil Texture Triangle, a small application for determining the texture class of a soil from the percentages of sand, silt and clay. It uses the 12 classes and the boundaries of the USDA Soil Survey Manual (Agriculture Handbook No. 18, 4th edition, 2018, chapter 3, pp. 122–124). It is written in JavaScript with Raphaël and released under the GNU General Public License v3.0 or later.

Why another triangle? Because in the field the texture of a layer is often estimated by feel, while the sedimentation test gives three percentages that still have to be converted into a class. With the printed triangle this is slow, and for students and new diggers it is easy to make mistakes. The app accepts any two values and calculates the third; the last two fields you edit stay manual, so you can start from clay+silt, clay+sand or silt+sand. The point moves on the triangle, the corresponding class is highlighted, and a click on the triangle does the inverse operation: from a position to a composition. The legend gives the official definition of each class.

Classification uses the USDA inequalities directly, not a polygon traced by hand. The polygons used for drawing are generated from the same rules with shapely, so they match the classification by construction. A Python script builds the dataset from a readable rules.json file and validates it on 18 test cases. The interface is bilingual (Italian and English) and switches the decimal separator as well. Since everything is local, the app also runs from a USB stick without an internet connection.

Below, you can see the app with clay 20 %, silt 40 % and sand 40 %, which gives a Loam class (Franco, in Italian).

The USDA Soil Texture Triangle with clay 20 %, silt 40 % and sand 40 %: the point falls in the Loam class.

The application is available at lucaarcteam.github.io/soil-texture-triangle, while the source code, the rules and the build script are on GitHub. The project is still under development. At the moment it covers only the USDA system: WRB and UK-ADAS use different classes and boundaries, and the sand subclasses (coarse sand, fine sand, very fine sand) are not implemented because they require the full particle-size distribution. Feedback from colleagues working in geoarchaeology is welcome.

I hope you find this useful. Have a nice day!



04 November, 2026 10:02AM by Luca Bezzi (noreply@blogger.com)

Ghostwriter, a Markdown editor to interact with AI

Hi everyone,

A few days ago I added a new entry to the ArcheOS software list, the GitHub project that marks the first step of the ArcheOS revival: Ghostwriter.

Ghostwriter is a free and open-source, distraction-free and themeable Markdown editor for Linux and Windows, recently moved into the KDE project. It provides a live HTML preview and can export to PDF, HTML, ODT and many other formats.

At first glance, a Markdown editor can look like an odd addition to a list of archaeological software. Actually, nowadays a growing part of our notes, reports and prompts are written in Markdown and produced together with AI agents: Ghostwriter is the application I use to read and edit those .md files, checking them with the live preview before committing them to a repository or sharing them with the team. In other words, it is the missing piece between the AI and our archaeological documents.

Below, you can see Ghostwriter during the archeometric study of the Cristo di Valcalda.

Use of Ghostwriter during the archeometric study of the Cristo di Valcalda.

For this reason, I have officially added Ghostwriter to the ArcheOS software list, both in the AI agents section and in the Utilities one. One more good reason: Ghostwriter is available in the Debian repositories, which is good news for the next steps of the ArcheOS roadmap.

I hope you find this useful. Have a nice day!


 

04 November, 2026 09:59AM by Luca Bezzi (noreply@blogger.com)

November 03, 2026

hackergotchi for Deepin

Deepin

hackergotchi for Qubes

Qubes

XSAs released on 2026-11-03

The Xen Project has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs). The security of Qubes OS is affected.

XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS

The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS:

XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS

The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary:

  • (none)

About this announcement

Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor as part of its architecture. When the Xen Project publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only positive confirmation that certain XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide negative confirmation that other XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker, which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.

03 November, 2026 12:00AM

QSB-121: Arbitrary read/write via grant copy (XSA-523)

We have published Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) 121: Arbitrary read/write via grant copy (XSA-523). The text of this QSB and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below, followed by a general explanation of this announcement and authentication instructions.

Qubes Security Bulletin 121


             ---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 121 ]===---

                              2026-11-03

            Arbitrary read/write via grant copy (XSA-523)

User action
------------

Continue to update normally [1] in order to receive the security updates
described in the "Patching" section below. No other user action is
required in response to this QSB.

Summary
--------

On 2026-11-03, the Xen Project published XSA-523, "arbitrary
read/write via grant copy" (CVE-2026-102703,CVE-2026-102704) [3]:
| A common access pattern is a batch of Grant Copy operations acting on
| adjacent address ranges in the same source or destination page. For
| performance reasons, Xen caches details internally to reuse already
| validated data. The conditions on when to re-validate the internal
| data were not correct in some cases:
|
|  - Frame numbers and grant references could wrongly be mixed up. This
|    is CVE-2026-102703.
|
|  - Copying by frame number (rather than grant reference) is permitted
|    only when operating on the caller's own memory. The check to
|    enforce this restriction was misplaced. This is CVE-2026-102704.

Impact
-------

A malicious qube can read and write arbitrary memory belonging to other
qubes, including dom0.

Affected systems
-----------------

All supported Qubes OS releases and configurations are affected.

Patching
---------

The following packages contain security updates that address the
vulnerabilities described in this bulletin:

  For Qubes 4.3, in dom0:
  - Xen packages, version 4.19.6-3

These packages will migrate from the security-testing repository to the
current (stable) repository over the next two weeks after being tested
by the community. [2] Once available, the packages should be installed
via the Qubes Update tool or its command-line equivalents. [1]

Dom0 must be restarted afterward in order for the updates to take
effect.

If you use Anti Evil Maid, you will need to reseal your secret
passphrase to new PCR values, as PCR18+19 will change due to the new Xen
binaries.

Credits
--------

See the original Xen Security Advisory. [3]

References
-----------

[1] https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/how-to-guides/how-to-update.html
[2] https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/downloading-installing-upgrading/testing.html
[3] https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-523.html

--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/

Source: qsb-121-2026.txt

Marek Marczykowski-Górecki’s PGP signature

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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=h9rr
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Source: qsb-121-2026.txt.sig.marmarek

Simon Gaiser (aka HW42)’s PGP signature

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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=yfXw
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Source: qsb-121-2026.txt.sig.simon

What is the purpose of this announcement?

The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes security bulletin (QSB) has been published.

What is a Qubes security bulletin (QSB)?

A Qubes security bulletin (QSB) is a security announcement issued by the Qubes security team. A QSB typically provides a summary and impact analysis of one or more recently-discovered software vulnerabilities, including details about patching to address them.

Why should I care about QSBs?

QSBs tell you what actions you must take in order to protect yourself from recently-discovered security vulnerabilities. In most cases, security vulnerabilities are addressed by updating normally. However, in some cases, special user action is required. In all cases, the required actions are detailed in QSBs.

What are the PGP signatures that accompany QSBs?

A PGP signature is a cryptographic digital signature made in accordance with the OpenPGP standard. PGP signatures can be cryptographically verified with programs like GNU Privacy Guard (GPG). The Qubes security team cryptographically signs all QSBs so that Qubes users have a reliable way to check whether QSBs are genuine. The only way to be certain that a QSB is authentic is by verifying its PGP signatures.

Why should I care whether a QSB is authentic?

A forged QSB could deceive you into taking actions that adversely affect the security of your Qubes OS system, such as installing malware or making configuration changes that render your system vulnerable to attack. Falsified QSBs could sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the security of Qubes OS or the status of the Qubes OS Project.

How do I verify the PGP signatures on a QSB?

The following command-line instructions assume a Linux system with git and gpg installed. (For Windows and Mac options, see OpenPGP software.)

  1. Obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK), e.g.:

    $ gpg --fetch-keys https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc
    gpg: directory '/home/user/.gnupg' created
    gpg: keybox '/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx' created
    gpg: requesting key from 'https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc'
    gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created
    gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: public key "Qubes Master Signing Key" imported
    gpg: Total number processed: 1
    gpg:               imported: 1
    

    (For more ways to obtain the QMSK, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key.)

  2. View the fingerprint of the PGP key you just imported. (Note: gpg> indicates a prompt inside of the GnuPG program. Type what appears after it when prompted.)

    $ gpg --edit-key 0x427F11FD0FAA4B080123F01CDDFA1A3E36879494
    gpg (GnuPG) 2.2.27; Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
    This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
    There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
       
       
    pub  rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
         created: 2010-04-01  expires: never       usage: SC
         trust: unknown       validity: unknown
    [ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
       
    gpg> fpr
    pub   rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 2010-04-01 Qubes Master Signing Key
     Primary key fingerprint: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123  F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
    
  3. Important: At this point, you still don’t know whether the key you just imported is the genuine QMSK or a forgery. In order for this entire procedure to provide meaningful security benefits, you must authenticate the QMSK out-of-band. Do not skip this step! The standard method is to obtain the QMSK fingerprint from multiple independent sources in several different ways and check to see whether they match the key you just imported. For more information, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key.

    Tip: After you have authenticated the QMSK out-of-band to your satisfaction, record the QMSK fingerprint in a safe place (or several) so that you don’t have to repeat this step in the future.

  4. Once you are satisfied that you have the genuine QMSK, set its trust level to 5 (“ultimate”), then quit GnuPG with q.

    gpg> trust
    pub  rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
         created: 2010-04-01  expires: never       usage: SC
         trust: unknown       validity: unknown
    [ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
       
    Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users' keys
    (by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.)
       
      1 = I don't know or won't say
      2 = I do NOT trust
      3 = I trust marginally
      4 = I trust fully
      5 = I trust ultimately
      m = back to the main menu
       
    Your decision? 5
    Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y
       
    pub  rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
         created: 2010-04-01  expires: never       usage: SC
         trust: ultimate      validity: unknown
    [ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
    Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct
    unless you restart the program.
       
    gpg> q
    
  5. Use Git to clone the qubes-secpack repo.

    $ git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git
    Cloning into 'qubes-secpack'...
    remote: Enumerating objects: 4065, done.
    remote: Counting objects: 100% (1474/1474), done.
    remote: Compressing objects: 100% (742/742), done.
    remote: Total 4065 (delta 743), reused 1413 (delta 731), pack-reused 2591
    Receiving objects: 100% (4065/4065), 1.64 MiB | 2.53 MiB/s, done.
    Resolving deltas: 100% (1910/1910), done.
    
  6. Import the included PGP keys. (See our PGP key policies for important information about these keys.)

    $ gpg --import qubes-secpack/keys/*/*
    gpg: key 063938BA42CFA724: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
    gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/core-devs/retired: read error: Is a directory
    gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
    gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
    gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: public key "HW42 (Qubes Signing Key)" imported
    gpg: key DA0434BC706E1FCF: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
    gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: 2 signatures not checked due to missing keys
    gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: public key "Andrew David Wong (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
    gpg: key AAA743B42FBC07A9: public key "Brennan Novak (Qubes Website & Documentation Signing)" imported
    gpg: key B6A0BB95CA74A5C3: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
    gpg: key F32894BE9684938A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
    gpg: key 6E7A27B909DAFB92: public key "Hakisho Nukama (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
    gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
    gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: public key "Sven Semmler (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
    gpg: key BB52274595B71262: public key "unman (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
    gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
    gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: public key "Wojtek Porczyk (Qubes OS documentation signing key)" imported
    gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
    gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: public key "Zrubi (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
    gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: "Qubes Master Signing Key" not changed
    gpg: key 1848792F9E2795E9: public key "Qubes OS Release 4 Signing Key" imported
    gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/release-keys/retired: read error: Is a directory
    gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
    gpg: key D655A4F21830E06A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" imported
    gpg: key ACC2602F3F48CB21: public key "Qubes OS Security Team" imported
    gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/security-team/retired: read error: Is a directory
    gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
    gpg: key 4AC18DE1112E1490: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" imported
    gpg: Total number processed: 17
    gpg:               imported: 16
    gpg:              unchanged: 1
    gpg: marginals needed: 3  completes needed: 1  trust model: pgp
    gpg: depth: 0  valid:   1  signed:   6  trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u
    gpg: depth: 1  valid:   6  signed:   0  trust: 6-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u
    
  7. Verify signed Git tags.

    $ cd qubes-secpack/
    $ git tag -v `git describe`
    object 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
    type commit
    tag marmarek_sec_266e14a6
    tagger Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 1677757924 +0100
       
    Tag for commit 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
    gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:52:04 AM PST
    gpg:                using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
    gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
    

    The exact output will differ, but the final line should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key. The [full] indicates full trust, which this key inherits in virtue of being validly signed by the QMSK.

  8. Verify PGP signatures, e.g.:

    $ cd QSBs/
    $ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-087-2022.txt
    gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 04:05:51 AM PST
    gpg:                using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
    gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
    $ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.simon qsb-087-2022.txt
    gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 03:50:42 AM PST
    gpg:                using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
    gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
    $ cd ../canaries/
    $ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.marmarek canary-034-2023.txt
    gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:51:48 AM PST
    gpg:                using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
    gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
    $ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.simon canary-034-2023.txt
    gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 01:47:52 AM PST
    gpg:                using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
    gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
    

    Again, the exact output will differ, but the final line of output from each gpg --verify command should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key.

For this announcement (QSB-121), the commands are:

$ gpg --verify qsb-121-2026.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-121-2026.txt
$ gpg --verify qsb-121-2026.txt.sig.simon qsb-121-2026.txt

You can also verify the signatures directly from this announcement in addition to or instead of verifying the files from the qubes-secpack. Simply copy and paste the QSB-121 text into a plain text file and do the same for both signature files. Then, perform the same authentication steps as listed above, substituting the filenames above with the names of the files you just created.

03 November, 2026 12:00AM

November 02, 2026

hackergotchi for ArcheOS

ArcheOS

DendrOS, an open-source dendrochronology software

Hi everyone,

Together with Mauro Bernabei (CNR-IBE, the Institute of BioEconomy of the Italian National Research Council), I have been developing a new piece of open-source software for our field: DendrOS.

DendrOS is a cross-platform application for dendrochronological analysis and cross-dating of tree-ring width series. It is written in Python with a PyQt6 interface and released under the GNU General Public License v3, so it runs on Linux and Windows and can be read, modified and redistributed like the rest of our Arc-Team tools.

The project started from a practical need. Many dendrochronologists still rely on PAST4 or PAST5. They are solid reference software, but closed-source and Windows-only, and they no longer fit the open workflow we built around our other projects. DendrOS aims to bring the same working method into the open-source world.

DendrOS can import the most common formats used in dendrochronology (.rwl, .txt and .fh, i.e. the CATRAS/Holmes format) and display them in an interactive time-series plot with pan, zoom and a movable year cursor. Series are managed in a tree with View/Edit/Ref/Info columns, and two separate vertical and horizontal zoom tools, inspired by PAST4, let you stretch the plot on a single axis.

The core of the application is cross-dating: DendrOS slides one or more samples against a reference series (or against a master chronology built on the fly) and ranks every possible position with the Baillie-Pilcher t-value (tBP), together with its p-value, the Pearson correlation coefficient and the Gleichläufigkeit percentage. The best offset can then be applied to the series with a click. Beyond cross-dating, DendrOS can build a master chronology by averaging the overlapping series, highlight concordance bands and pointer years (Weiserjahre), and detrend/index the series through the dplPy library (spline, modified negative exponential, Hugershoff, linear, horizontal). The whole session is saved in a readable .dendro project file.

Below, you can see the main window of DendrOS.

The main window of DendrOS, with the series tree on the left and the time-series plot on the right.

DendrOS is already part of the ArcheOS software list, the GitHub project that marks the first step of the ArcheOS revival, in the dendrochronology section. You can find the source code and the user guide on GitHub, while a pre-built Windows executable is generated automatically from the latest commit and published under Releases, so no Python installation is required to try it.

The project is still under active development, so any feedback from colleagues working with dendrochronology is more than welcome.

I hope you find this useful. Have a nice day!


 

02 November, 2026 06:01PM by Luca Bezzi (noreply@blogger.com)

3DHOP x-ray tool 2.0

Hi everyone,

Last May I released the x-ray tool, a small extension for 3DHOP I had developed during the 3D documentation project of the Similaun mummy (Ötzi). It loads two aligned meshes of the same subject, an outer surface and an inner structure, and lets you make the outer one semi-transparent, so that what is inside becomes visible without moving the camera. In the first version the effect was a simple on/off toggle.

I have just published version 2.0, which turns that toggle into a real-time control. A new x-ray intensity slider, at the bottom centre of the viewer, regulates the transparency of the outer shell continuously, from an almost invisible shell to a dense "ghost"; the value used on the Ötzi project, 0.9, is still the default, and the toolbar button remains as an on/off shortcut. Version 2.0 also adds the standard 3DHOP measure tool, calibrated in millimetres.

To make the tool easier to try, the repository now includes a live demo on GitHub Pages: lucaarcteam.github.io/3dhop_x-ray_extension/x-ray.html. The demo subject is a left hand with two rings, a homage to Wilhelm Röntgen's first radiograph (Hand mit Ringen, 1895): you can orbit the model, switch the x-ray on and drag the slider to see the bones appear through the skin in real time.

Below, you can see the live demo of the x-ray tool 2.0.

The x-ray tool 2.0 live demo: the Röntgen hand, with the x-ray slider and the skeleton visible through the skin.

Everything runs in the browser with static files, with no server-side code. As in the first version, the 3DHOP core is left untouched: all the extension logic lives in the x-ray.html page and uses the native transparency API, so the tool keeps working with upstream 3DHOP. The code is released under GPL-3.0-or-later, while the demo models come from the open Z-Anatomy atlas (CC BY-SA 4.0).

You can find the source code, the live demo and the release notes on GitHub. The tool was born within the study published in Heritage 2026.

I hope you find this useful. Have a nice day!


 

02 November, 2026 05:50PM by Luca Bezzi (noreply@blogger.com)

hackergotchi for ARMBIAN

ARMBIAN

Github Highlights

Github Highlights

This week&aposs work centers on a large-scale kernel CVE backporting program for the 6.1 and 6.12 LTS series, a CPU tuning and frequency framework overhaul, and sustained board, SoC, and vendor-kernel maintenance across the Rockchip, MediaTek, and Allwinner ecosystems.

The CVE effort dominates activity, with more than one hundred reviewed backport sets landing across 6.1 and 6.12 covering networking (mac80211, cfg80211, Bluetooth, netfilter, mlx5, stmmac), filesystems (btrfs, f2fs, ext4, smb client, ksmbd), virtualization (KVM SVM/SEV, vhost, virtio), graphics (amdgpu, i915, vc4, msm), and core subsystems (bpf, mm, io_uring). Supporting this is a new fasttrack CI pipeline with per-series sharding, build-time header-change verification, triage records for not-affected verdicts, and tagged releases on each patch set change. The configurations repository has been updated to enable kernel CVE fixes across builds.

Platform work introduces a new per-cluster cpufreq and tuning-profile system that replaces cpufrequtils with image-level profiles, exposed through configng. Board additions include the Seeed reComputer Industrial RK3576, Boardcon EM3588, CZ.NIC Turris Omnia, Hardkernel ODROID-U2/U3/X2, and the DshanPi A1 CM5, while Rockchip vendor kernels gain NPU enablement on Orange Pi CM5, ArmSoM CM5-IO and Rock 4D, along with CAN-FD support for the RK3576. MediaTek Filogic boards move to the 6.18 LTS kernel with U-Boot 2026.10, the Anbernic RG DS and RG Vita Pro receive charge-screen and USB fixes, and the UWE5622 wireless driver sees fixes for memory corruption, teardown, and TCP ACK stalls.

#Armbian #EmbeddedLinux #Rockchip #KernelSecurity #CVE #MediaTek

Changes

02 November, 2026 03:53PM by Michael Robinson

November 01, 2026

hackergotchi for SparkyLinux

SparkyLinux

Sparky news 2026/10

The 10th monthly Sparky project and donate report of the 2026: – Linux kernel updated up to 7.3.1, 6.18.60-LTS, 6.12.115-LTS (amd64 + i686-pae) – Linux kernel 7.2 AOL – the first release of SparkyOS onUSB 2026.10 based on Arch Linux released (UEFI mode only) Next to do: – SparkyOS onUSB 2026.11 Arch and Debian UEFI/Bios will be released in November – SparkyLinux 8.5 will be released in…

Source

01 November, 2026 07:58PM by pavroo

hackergotchi for Qubes

Qubes

Fedora 43 approaching end of life

Fedora 43 is currently scheduled to reach end of life (EOL) on 2026-12-09 (approximately one month from the date of this announcement). Please upgrade all of your Fedora templates and standalones by that date. For more information, see Upgrading to avoid EOL.

There are two ways to upgrade a template to a new Fedora release:

Please note that no user action is required regarding the OS version in dom0 (see our note on dom0 and EOL).

01 November, 2026 12:00AM

October 30, 2026

hackergotchi for Tails

Tails

Tails 7.16

Changes and updates

  • Update Tor Browser to 16.0.

    Tor Browser 16.0 is based on Firefox 153 and inherits its redesigned settings.

  • Update the Tor client to 0.4.9.15.

Fixed problems

  • Fix OpenPGP support in Thunderbird. (#21841)

Get Tails 7.16

To upgrade your Tails USB stick and keep your Persistent Storage

  • Automatic upgrades are available from Tails 7.0 or later to 7.16.

  • If you cannot do an automatic upgrade or if Tails fails to start after an automatic upgrade, please try to do a manual upgrade.

To install Tails 7.16 on a new USB stick

Follow our installation instructions.

The Persistent Storage on the USB stick will be lost if you install instead of upgrading.

To download only

If you don't need installation or upgrade instructions, you can download Tails 7.16 directly:

30 October, 2026 12:00AM

hackergotchi for Qubes

Qubes

Qubes OS Summit 2026 starts today!

Qubes OS Summit 2026 is finally here! Today, Friday, October 30, marks the first day of the Summit, which will begin at 9:30am CET (UTC+1) in Berlin, Germany. Whether you’re joining us in person at Refugio Berlin or online via the livestream, we’re excited for you to see the presentations our speakers have prepared for you!

Still need a ticket, or not sure if you do? There are three ways to attend the Summit:

  1. In person at Refugio Berlin
    • Requires a paid on-site ticket
    • Grants access to the hackathon (including interactive workshops) and any design sessions (depending on conference schedule)
    • Provides the opportunity to socialize, network, and mingle with like-minded individuals who are passionate about secure computing
    • Grants exclusive access to any non-livestreamed, non-recorded presentations (see below)
    • Grants access to attend presentations and participate as a live audience member
  2. Actively participate online
    • Requires a free virtual ticket
    • For those who are presenting remotely
    • For those who are attending presentations remotely and wish to ask questions or engage in active discussion in the Matrix room (#qubes-summit:matrix.org) during the presentations
    • Does not grant access to the hackathon or any design sessions
    • Does not provide the opportunity to socialize, network, or mingle with like-minded individuals who are passionate about secure computing
    • Does not grant access to any non-livestreamed, non-recorded presentations (see below)
    • Does not grant access to attend presentations as a live audience member
  3. Passively view online
    • No ticket or registration required
    • For those who simply wish to watch the presentations via the public live stream and recorded videos
    • Does not provide the ability to ask questions or engage in active discussion during the presentations
    • Does not grant access to the hackathon or any design sessions
    • Does not provide the opportunity to socialize, network, or mingle with like-minded individuals who are passionate about secure computing
    • Does not grant access to any non-livestreamed, non-recorded presentations (see below)
    • Does not grant access to attend presentations as a live audience member

Note: As mentioned above, presenters have the option to request that their presentations not be recorded. If a presenter opts out of recording, there will be a “no recording” icon next to that presentation in the conference schedule. Only on-site attendees will be able to view that presentation. It will not be livestreamed or recorded for later viewing.

When and where

Friday, October 30 @ 9:30 AM — Sunday, November 1 @ 3:00 PM (GMT+1)

Refugio Berlin
Lenaustraße 3-4
12047 Berlin
View on OpenStreetMap

Livestream: https://streaming.media.ccc.de/qubes_os/main

Thank you to our sponsors

We’re grateful to our sponsors for making Qubes OS Summit 2026 possible!

Gold-tier sponsor

Freedom of the Press Foundation logo

Freedom of the Press Foundation (FPF) is a long-standing Qubes Partner. As a nonprofit organization, it is dedicated to supporting and defending public interest journalism. It leads the development of SecureDrop, an open-source whistleblower submission platform used by more than 50 media organizations around the world to securely accept documents from anonymous sources. FPF uses Qubes OS in the development of an integrated SecureDrop Workstation.

Silver-tier sponsors

NovaCustom logo

NovaCustom builds custom laptops, mini PCs, and smartphones with a focus on privacy, security, and customization. They offer the freedom of Dasharo coreboot firmware, true repairability, and a plethora of customization options. Several NovaCustom models are officially certified for Qubes OS.

Nitrokey logo

Nitrokey is a world leader in open-source security hardware. They develop hardware for data encryption, key management, user authentication, network devices, desktops, laptops, and smartphones. Several NitroPads and NitroPCs are officially certified for Qubes OS.

Code of conduct

This event is covered by the Qubes OS Project’s code of conduct.

30 October, 2026 12:00AM

Qubes OS Summit 2026 starts today!

Qubes OS Summit 2026 is finally here! Today, Friday, October 30, marks the first day of the Summit, which will begin at 9:30am CET (UTC+1) in Berlin, Germany. Whether you’re joining us in person at Refugio Berlin or online via the livestream, we’re excited for you to see the presentations our speakers have prepared for you!

Still need a ticket? There are three ways to attend the Summit:

  1. In person at Refugio Berlin
    • Requires a paid on-site ticket
    • Grants access to the hackathon (including interactive workshops) and any design sessions (depending on conference schedule)
    • Provides the opportunity to socialize, network, and mingle with like-minded individuals who are passionate about secure computing
    • Grants exclusive access to any non-livestreamed, non-recorded presentations (see below)
    • Grants access to attend presentations and participate as a live audience member
  2. Actively participate online
    • Requires a free virtual ticket
    • For those who are presenting remotely
    • For those who are attending presentations remotely and wish to ask questions or engage in active discussion in the Matrix room (#qubes-summit:matrix.org) during the presentations
    • Does not grant access to the hackathon or any design sessions
    • Does not provide the opportunity to socialize, network, or mingle with like-minded individuals who are passionate about secure computing
    • Does not grant access to any non-livestreamed, non-recorded presentations (see below)
    • Does not grant access to attend presentations as a live audience member
  3. Passively view online
    • No ticket or registration required
    • For those who simply wish to watch the presentations via the public live stream and recorded videos
    • Does not provide the ability to ask questions or engage in active discussion during the presentations
    • Does not grant access to the hackathon or any design sessions
    • Does not provide the opportunity to socialize, network, or mingle with like-minded individuals who are passionate about secure computing
    • Does not grant access to any non-livestreamed, non-recorded presentations (see below)
    • Does not grant access to attend presentations as a live audience member

Note: As mentioned above, presenters have the option to request that their presentations not be recorded. If a presenter opts out of recording, there will be a “no recording” icon next to that presentation in the conference schedule. Only on-site attendees will be able to view that presentation. It will not be livestreamed or recorded for later viewing.

When and where

Friday, October 30 @ 9:30 AM — Sunday, November 1 @ 3:00 PM (GMT+1)

Refugio Berlin
Lenaustraße 3-4
12047 Berlin
View on OpenStreetMap

Livestream: https://streaming.media.ccc.de/qubes_os/main

Thank you to our sponsors

We’re grateful to our sponsors for making Qubes OS Summit 2026 possible!

Gold-tier sponsor

Freedom of the Press Foundation logo

Freedom of the Press Foundation (FPF) is a long-standing Qubes Partner. As a nonprofit organization, it is dedicated to supporting and defending public interest journalism. It leads the development of SecureDrop, an open-source whistleblower submission platform used by more than 50 media organizations around the world to securely accept documents from anonymous sources. FPF uses Qubes OS in the development of an integrated SecureDrop Workstation.

Silver-tier sponsors

NovaCustom logo

NovaCustom builds custom laptops, mini PCs, and smartphones with a focus on privacy, security, and customization. They offer the freedom of Dasharo coreboot firmware, true repairability, and a plethora of customization options. Several NovaCustom models are officially certified for Qubes OS.

Nitrokey logo

Nitrokey is a world leader in open-source security hardware. They develop hardware for data encryption, key management, user authentication, network devices, desktops, laptops, and smartphones. Several NitroPads and NitroPCs are officially certified for Qubes OS.

Code of conduct

This event is covered by the Qubes OS Project’s code of conduct.

30 October, 2026 12:00AM

October 29, 2026

hackergotchi for ZEVENET

ZEVENET

Source NAT (SNAT) in SKUDONET Enterprise Edition 10.4.0: Set the Source IP per Backend

Some backends don’t accept connections from just anyone: an SMTP relay that only trusts one address, an application server behind an IP allow list and a hardened legacy service that nobody wants to touch. Put a load balancer in front of them and that rule becomes a problem, because the address the backend sees now depends on how the balancer connects to it. 

Source NAT, or SNAT, is how you take control of that address. The new SKUDONET Enterprise Edition 10.4.0, released in October 2026, adds it as a per-backend setting, available on every farm profile. This article covers how it works, how to configure it and when it’s better to leave it off. 

What is Source NAT (SNAT)?

Source NAT (Source Network Address Translation) rewrites the source IP address of a packet as it passes through a network device. On a load balancer, it lets you open connections to a backend from an IP address you choose, instead of the one the connection would use by default.

The problem: backends that filter by source IP

Filtering by source address is common, and often for good reasons. SMTP servers limit who can relay through them. Application servers accept requests only from a known address. The rule is simple: traffic from IP X gets in, everything else doesn’t.

With a balancer in the path, that rule needs an answer. Either the backend allows list changes, or the balancer presents an address the backend already trusts. When the backend can’t be touched, only the second option remains.

The problem gets sharper when one balancer serves many farms and only some of their backends have this restriction. A global setting is too blunt: you’d change the behaviour of traffic that never needed it.

We built SNAT after a real request. A customer migrating from NetScaler needed certain backends to see the balancer’s traffic coming from one specific, accepted IP, with everything else left as it was. That need is what led us to develop it, and it’s now part of the product.

How SNAT works in SKUDONET Enterprise Edition

We implemented SNAT with netfilter’s nat layer, and you control it from the backend itself, inside the farm. This is how you set it up in SKUDONET Enterprise Edition:

  1. Open the farm and the service that contains the backend, and go to its list of backends.
  2. Click the edit icon of the backend that needs SNAT.
  3. In the SNAT field, open the dropdown. Each option shows an IP address and its network interface, and you can filter the list with the search box. Disabled is the default.
  4. Select the IP you want the backend to see as the source of the connections.
  5. Click Apply.
Edit backend dialog with the SNAT dropdown open, showing 172.16.100.69 (eth1:VIP) and Disabled Figure: Edit backend dialog with the SNAT dropdown open, showing 172.16.100.69 (eth1:VIP) and Disabled

From then on, that backend’s connections leave the balancer with the selected source IP. It also helps keep return traffic on the right path: the backend’s replies go back through the load balancer. Besides that, the backend list gets a SNAT column, so you can audit which backends use SNAT, and with which IP, at a glance.

 Backend list of a farm. Backends 172.16.100.254 and 172.16.100.253 both use 172.16.100.69 as their SNAT addressFigure: Backend list of a farm. Backends 172.16.100.254 and 172.16.100.253 both use 172.16.100.69 as their SNAT address

The same setting is available through the API, so you can include it in your existing automation. One limit to know about: each backend takes a single SNAT IP for now, not a pool. The FAQ explains when that matters.

Granularity: farm, service, backend

The useful part is how precisely you can apply it. The decision is made for a specific backend of a specific service in a specific farm, not for the whole appliance.

Imagine a cluster balancing a public web farm and a mail submission farm. Only one of the mail backends restricts connections to a single address, say 172.16.100.69. You set that IP as SNAT on that backend and leave everything else untouched. The web farm keeps its normal behaviour, and so do the other backends in the mail farm that don’t need the exception. 

Diagram of a SKUDONET balancer with a web farm and a mail farm. Only mail backend 1 uses SNAT, so it sees the source IP 172.16.100.69.SNAT applied to a single backend: the web farm and the other mail backend keep their default behaviour.

What SNAT does not change

SNAT acts on the leg between the balancer and the backend. Anything that happens between the client and the balancer stays as it was. That includes TLS termination, as described in our SSL offloading guide, and the inspection done by the WAF, which we cover in What Is Application Security?.

At TCP level, the backend sees the connection coming from the SNAT address. That is what makes the filtering work, and it is also how you spot it in a packet capture. On HTTP farms, the X-Forwarded-For header is not modified. If the next hop is another proxy, though, that proxy will add the SNAT address to the header, so expect to see it there. 

Health checks and Farm Guardian

If a backend only accepts connections from one address, a health check coming from any other IP would fail, and the balancer could mark a healthy server as down. SNAT is integrated with Farm Guardian to avoid that. When the service of a farm has a Farm Guardian, the health check uses the SNAT IP and simulates the same communication the balancer makes. It verifies that the backend is alive and answers requests from that address.

When to use it, and when not to

Use it when a backend needs to see a specific source IP and you can’t, or don’t want to, change the backend. IP-filtered SMTP servers and application servers are the typical cases.

Don’t use it by default. Our team’s recommendation is to avoid configuring SNAT on every backend of every farm. Each exception is one more thing to remember when troubleshooting: the address you see in the backend’s logs no longer matches what you’d expect from the rest of the platform. Enable it where it’s needed and nowhere else.

Try it on your own backends

The quickest way to judge SNAT is to test it against the backend that causes you the most trouble. Download the SKUDONET Enterprise Edition evaluation and set it up on one backend of a test farm.

FAQ

What is the difference between SNAT and DNAT?
SNAT rewrites the source address of a packet; DNAT rewrites the destination. A load balancer uses DNAT-style translation to send traffic to a backend, and SNAT to change who that traffic appears to come from.

Is there a limit on concurrent connections with a single SNAT IP?
Each connection from one source IP to a given backend address and port needs its own source port, and that range is finite. With very high volumes of concurrent connections to one backend, a single SNAT IP can eventually run out of ports. A pool of SNAT IPs would spread that load, but it is not part of this release.

What happens to SNAT in a cluster failover?
The configuration made on the master node is replicated to the backup, and connections are preserved on failover.

29 October, 2026 11:11AM by Isabel Perez

SKUDONET Enterprise Edition 10.4.0: SNAT per Backend and More Control Over Return Traffic

SKUDONET Enterprise Edition 10.4.0 is now available. Its main addition is SNAT: you can now choose the source IP address the load balancer uses when it forwards traffic to each backend.

The release also extends Last Hop to TCP SSL and L4xNAT farms. It adds a resource manager for management and protection services, and brings a few usability improvements and several fixes in farms and Last Hop.

What’s new in SKUDONET Enterprise Edition 10.4.0?

  • SNAT for backends, with a selectable source IP per backend
  • Last Hop support in TCP SSL and L4xNAT farms
  • A new resource manager: skd-resource-governor
  • Search in selection lists and by columns in tables
  • Better handling of network interfaces whose link comes up late
  • Six fixes affecting L4xNAT, TCP SSL, HTTP farms and Last Hop

SNAT: choose the source IP for each backend

With SNAT, administrators select the source IP address used when forwarding traffic to each backend. That gives you more control over how the load balancer connects to your servers, and it simplifies firewall allowlisting, since the traffic arrives from an address you picked.

It also helps direct return traffic through the load balancer. And because every backend can have its own source IP, you can adapt the setup to what each network requires.

We explain how it works and how to configure it, step by step, in the technical article Source NAT (SNAT) in SKUDONET Enterprise Edition 10.4.0: Set the Source IP per Backend.

Last Hop now also covers TCP SSL and L4xNAT farms

Last Hop arrived in Enterprise Edition 10.2.2 for HTTP and HTTP/2 farms. With 10.4.0, it also works in TCP SSL and L4xNAT farms, so control over the return path reaches more application protocols.

The load balancer learns where incoming connections arrive from and uses that to send the response through the corresponding network interface and the previous network device. It’s especially useful in environments with several gateways or firewalls.

If you want the background on asymmetric routing and how this works, it’s all in our Last Hop technical article.

A resource manager for management and protection services

10.4.0 introduces skd-resource-governor, a new system resource manager. It organizes the system processes and controls how much CPU, memory and how many processes the management and protection services can consume.

Those services are now separated from the traffic processing runtime, which helps contain resource spikes and reduces their impact on application delivery. The manager also shows how resources are allocated, which is useful for troubleshooting and capacity planning.

Improvements

Search in selection lists and tables. Selection lists now have a search option, and tables can be searched by column to narrow results using specific attributes. In larger deployments, finding the object you need takes less time.

Interfaces that come up late. We’ve improved how SKUDONET handles an interface when its physical link becomes available (netplug), including when a switch port comes up after the system has already started. The interface configuration is applied correctly, and connectivity recovers better after a delayed link.

Bug fixes

L4xNAT farms

  • Backends in down or maintenance state are now handled consistently. You can take servers out of service for maintenance, and unavailable backends are no longer treated as valid destinations for new connections.
  • FarmGuardian health checks now evaluate backends in down state correctly, so recovered servers are detected and their status is updated.
  • Port validation for SCTP configurations has been corrected, and valid SCTP settings are now accepted.

TCP SSL farms

  • FarmGuardian integration now handles health check results correctly. The availability detected by monitoring matches the backend status the farm uses to distribute traffic.

HTTP farms

  • L7 Smart Routing now applies routing rules correctly in configurations that use only HTTP farms.

Last Hop

  • A stopped farm that overlaps with another farm’s configuration no longer interferes with Last Hop in the farms that are active.

If you want to see SNAT and the rest of the changes on your own infrastructure, download the evaluation:

29 October, 2026 11:10AM by Isabel Perez

hackergotchi for Deepin

Deepin

October 28, 2026

hackergotchi for ARMBIAN

ARMBIAN

Armbian Newsletter October 2026

Armbian Newsletter October 2026

Welcome to the latest Armbian newsletter! This development cycle brings a massive wave of progress across the entire ecosystem, packed with broad new board enablement, major platform maturation, and essential tooling upgrades. Highlights include:

Extensive Board Enablement: Expanding support across multiple SoC families—including the EasePi R1, Pine64 Quartz64 Zero, ArmSoM CM7s IO board, Boardcon EM3588, Skysi X5 laptop, Banana Pi BPI-M4, Qualcomm Lenovo Legion Y700 Gen 4, NVIDIA Jetson Nano, Altera Agilex 5 SoCDK, Banana Pi R3 Mini, Firefly AIBOX-K3, Radxa Rock 2A/2F, and Anbernic handhelds like the RG Rotate.

Bootloader & Kernel Modernization: A sweeping refresh moving numerous platforms to U-Boot v2026.10, TF-A lts-v2.14.11, and updated DDR blobs, alongside mainline kernel progression advancing to 7.3 across rockchip64, meson64, sunxi, and uefi targets.

Deep Rockchip & Vendor Refinements: Major kernel, media, and wireless achievements, including 6 Gbps SATA on RK3588, RK3576 Panfrost GPU overlays, Amlogic VDEC fixes, and a consolidated rk35xx-vendor-next kernel branch.

Tooling & Infrastructure Overhaul: Significant upgrades to the Armbian Imager (featuring Settings page, board-scoped profiles, and ext4 writer hardening), alongside refactored armbian-install, armbianmonitor, singlemode repository management with Acquire-By-Hash, and improved CI resilience.

SPONSORED
Armbian Newsletter October 2026

Join us in making open source better! Every donation helps Armbian improve security, performance, and reliability — so everyone can enjoy a solid foundation for their devices.

Github Highlights
This cycle is defined by three themes: broad new board enablement, a coordinated U-Boot v2026.10 refresh across Rockchip and Allwinner platforms, and substantial Rockchip kernel, media, and wireless work. Board support expanded on multiple SoC families, including the EasePi R1 and Pine64 Quartz64 Zero on RK3568, the ArmSoM
Your whole smart home, on a new board, before the coffee gets cold
We moved our Home Assistant to a bigger board, and nothing needed re-pairing Our house runs on Armbian, and it has for years. Its Home Assistant setup started on an Allwinner H5 NanoPi K1 Plus. In 2025, it moved to the Rockchip NanoPi R3S LTS as soon as that
Armbian Imager 2.5 is out
Armbian Imager 2.5 sets up your board from a few simple questions, double-checks your storage before it writes, and now speaks Greek and Serbian.

28 October, 2026 08:17PM by Michael Robinson

Your whole smart home, on a new board, before the coffee gets cold

We moved our Home Assistant to a bigger board, and nothing needed re-pairing

Your whole smart home, on a new board, before the coffee gets cold

Our house runs on Armbian, and it has for years. Its Home Assistant setup started on an Allwinner H5 NanoPi K1 Plus. In 2025, it moved to the Rockchip NanoPi R3S LTS as soon as that board came out. This month it moved again, to the NanoPi M6.

It was a live install: a Z-Wave mesh, a Zigbee network, a pile of automations and years of history. We expected at least one evening of re-pairing sensors. It took about half an hour, and every device came back on its own.

Before: NanoPi R3S LTS After: NanoPi M6 V2
SoC Rockchip RK3566 Rockchip RK3588S
CPU 4 × Cortex-A55 4 × Cortex-A76 + 4 × Cortex-A55
RAM 2 GB 8 GB
Storage 32 GB eMMC 64 GB eMMC, NVMe slot free

Both on Armbian trixie with Home Assistant Supervised.

The R3S served us well, but the M6 is a big step up. Its Cortex-A76 cores and four times the memory mean dashboards open faster, history loads quicker, and there’s room for more apps. Everything runs from the 64 GB on-board eMMC for now, so the NVMe slot is free for later.

The whole move, by the numbers: one backup file, one armbian-config entry, zero re-paired devices, about 30 minutes end to end.

Why it’s this easy

Two things do the heavy lifting.

First, a Home Assistant backup holds the whole house: configuration, dashboards, automations, history and installed apps. Armbian runs the same Supervised stack on every board it supports, so the backup doesn’t care what hardware it’s restored onto.

Second, your Z-Wave and Zigbee networks live on the USB sticks, not on the computer. Move the sticks and the devices follow.

The move, step by step

1. Take a backup on the old device

Go to Settings → System → Backups, create a full backup, and download the .tar file to your computer.

2. Put Armbian on the new board

Download the Armbian Debian Trixie minimal image for your board from armbian.com, write it to an SD card or eMMC, and boot. Home Assistant Supervised on Armbian only works on Debian Trixie, so don’t pick Ubuntu or another Debian release.

3. Give it a fixed IP address

Your phones, dashboards and automations expect Home Assistant at an address that doesn’t change. Set a static IP in armbian-config, as described in Network settings. You can also edit Netplan by hand using the networking guide, or set a DHCP reservation on your router.

If you want everything to keep working as before, reuse the old device’s address. Just switch the old device off first so the two don’t fight over it.

4. Install Home Assistant with armbian-config

Open armbian-config → Software → Home Automation and pick Home Assistant. Or do it in one line:

armbian-config --cmd HAS001

The installer sets up Docker, the Supervisor and the OS agent, then waits until the web interface responds. Reboot when it asks.

5. Plug in your USB radios

Move the Z-Wave and Zigbee sticks from the old device to the new one before you restore. That way the apps find their hardware the first time they start.

6. Upload the backup

Open http://<board-ip>:8123. On the welcome screen, choose to restore from a backup and upload your .tar file. The restore runs in the background. When Home Assistant restarts, reload the page and log in with your usual account.

That’s it. Your house is back.

The radios just work

Home Assistant finds USB sticks by their stable names under /dev/serial/by-id/. Those names come from the stick itself, not from the board, so they’re identical on the new machine. In our move:

  • Aeotec Z-Stick Gen5: Z-Wave JS connected, and every node reported ready.
  • Sonoff Zigbee 3.0 Dongle Plus: ZHA picked up the network with every device in place.

Forgot to plug a stick in first? No harm done. Plug it in now and restore just that app from the same backup:

ha backups restore <backup-slug> --app core_zwave_js

A couple of finishing touches

  • Take a fresh backup on the new board once everything is running, so your next move starts from here.
  • Check your custom integrations. If you use HACS or other custom components, make sure they loaded, and reinstall any that are missing.

A note on support: the Supervised installation method is maintained by the Armbian team and isn’t officially supported by the Home Assistant project. Hardware questions go to the Armbian forum. Application issues you can also reproduce on the official Home Assistant OS go to the Home Assistant community.

28 October, 2026 03:06PM by Igor Pecovnik

Armbian Imager 2.5 is out

Armbian Imager 2.5 is out

The easiest way to get Armbian onto your board just got easier. In Armbian Imager 2.5, you set up a board by answering a few simple questions, and Imager double-checks your storage right before it writes. Settings now has a page of its own, and the app speaks Greek and Serbian too.

Armbian Imager 2.5 in four minutes: the real app, from start to finish.

Set up your board with a few answers

A first-boot profile writes your network, user account, SSH keys, language and time zone onto the card, so the board is ready to use the moment it boots. In 2.5, New profile walks you through setup one question at a time: how the board connects, who logs in, which language and time zone to use, and how you sign in. Skip whatever you don’t need. Your answers build up in a column next to the questions, so you always see what the profile will do.

Imager also catches the mistakes that are hardest to track down on a board with no screen. If you type a static address that can’t work, like your subnet’s broadcast address or a gateway outside the subnet, Imager tells you while you type. Add SSH keys from GitHub, GitLab or a link, and Imager fetches them and shows you which keys it found. A typo in a user name shows up right there, not after your first failed login.

Profiles also fit more naturally into the rest of the app:

  • Use one profile for every board, or only for the boards you pick.
  • Choose a profile from a menu just before you write. Icons show Wi-Fi or cable, user, time zone and keys at a glance.
  • Use profiles with Armbian images you build yourself.
  • A board with no screen and no network no longer gets stuck at first login asking “Connect via wireless?”. The profile answers for it.
  • Pick any Wi-Fi country that Linux’s wireless regulatory database accepts.

One last check before anything is erased

Just before it writes, Imager checks the target one more time. It only writes to a writable disk it found itself, at the exact size you confirmed. Swapping cards while the password prompt is open can’t send the image to the wrong one. If the image is too big for the storage, or the file is empty, Imager stops before erasing anything. And if a device can’t be used, Imager tells you why, in your language.

You can now cancel at any stage, even while the image is still being prepared. When the write finishes, the last screen tells you what you wrote to: an SD card, a USB drive or a disk. For Qualcomm boards in EDL mode, Imager matches the board you selected by its serial number, so it writes to that board and no other.

A nicer app all round

Settings get a page of their own: The gear icon now opens a full page with five sections: General, Writing, First-boot profiles, Downloads and storage, and About and support. Each section has a small animation that reacts to its settings. The General scene changes with your theme, and the Downloads scene shows when you’re offline. Change the theme or reduce motion, and you see the result before you save.

More room on the home screen: The page numbers under the manufacturer and board grids are now a small glass pager. It floats over the cards and opens when you point at it, so the grid gets the whole window. Board names are no longer cut short, and vendor logos keep their colors.

Twenty languages: Imager now speaks Greek and Serbian, which brings it to twenty languages. The first time you open it, it starts in your system’s language.

Help when something goes wrong: If Armbian’s servers don’t respond, Imager says so and gives you a Retry button. Upload Logs sends this session’s log to paste.armbian.com and gives you a link to add to your bug report, plus a QR code if you’d rather grab it on your phone. If a Settings section can’t load, it tells you. Checksum, verification and decompression errors now come with a plain-language explanation.

Updates in the background: When a new version is out, you’ll see it in the sidebar and under About and support in Settings. Click Install and the update downloads in the background while you keep working. Click Restart Now when you’re ready. If a write is in progress, the restart waits until it’s done.

Under the hood

Debug builds include a scenarios panel that simulates SD cards, USB drives, EDL boards, write errors and network failures. That’s how we filmed the video above: every shot is the real app, and not a single real card was erased. Every release build is checked to make sure none of that code ships. CI now also audits dependencies and checks the Windows code.

Thank you

Special thanks to Superkali, the main developer behind this application, for doing the heavy lifting and driving most of the improvements. Thanks also to Emmanouil C. for reviewing the Greek translation, Aleksandar D. for reviewing the Serbian translation, Igor P. for improving static IP checks and fixing the wireless prompt, Cyrus Ho for adding missing Wi-Fi country codes, and Xavier S. for displaying the device type on the final screen.

Get it

Armbian Imager 2.5 is out now for Mac, Linux and Windows, free and open source. Already running 2.0 or later? Imager will offer you the update.

Download Armbian Imager 2.5

28 October, 2026 03:05PM by Daniele Briguglio

October 27, 2026

hackergotchi for VyOS

VyOS

VyOS Project October 2026 Update

Hello, Community!

This update covers the changes that landed in Rolling in September and October, and looking back, the month has a theme that nobody planned.

A commit is a promise: change what I asked for, and leave everything else alone. This month, we found several places where VyOS broke that promise. With certain routing options set, a commit that only touched a route-map description could reset BGP sessions or OSPF adjacencies. Elsewhere, configurations committed without complaint and then quietly did something else. Much of this post is about closing those gaps, and about the community members who found several of them on their own routers.

There is new ground too: MPLS Inter-AS label switching, BGP-LS for SRv6, a VXLAN extension that carries firewall marks, and updates to DHCP, VPP, and OpenVPN. Please read the security section before you upgrade.

27 October, 2026 12:44PM by Taras Pudiak (taras@vyos.io)

hackergotchi for ARMBIAN

ARMBIAN

Github Highlights

Github Highlights

This cycle is defined by three themes: broad new board enablement, a coordinated U-Boot v2026.10 refresh across Rockchip and Allwinner platforms, and substantial Rockchip kernel, media, and wireless work.

Board support expanded on multiple SoC families, including the EasePi R1 and Pine64 Quartz64 Zero on RK3568, the ArmSoM CM7s IO board and Boardcon EM3588 on RK3588, Forlinx OK3572-C, and the Skysi X5 laptop. The Banana Pi BPI-M4 (RTD1395) and Cubieboard 4 returned with full enablement including A80 cpufreq, thermal, HDMI, and audio. Qualcomm support advanced with the Lenovo Legion Y700 Gen 4 on an SM8750 edge kernel bumped to 7.2.11, while the NVIDIA Jetson Nano joined the uefi-arm64-dt target.

A sweeping bootloader refresh moved numerous platforms to U-Boot v2026.10, TF-A lts-v2.14.11, and refreshed DDR blobs, covering Radxa RK3399, RockPro64, Rock Pi 4C, NanoPi M4, Orange Pi 4 variants, Tinker Board 2, Mixtile Blade3 and Edge2, and the Recomputer RK3588 devkit. GRUB images gained a separate ext2/ext4 /boot partition and now honour UEFISIZE, and the build framework switched to the new git.u-boot-project.org upstream host.

On the kernel side, the RK3588 gained working 6 Gbps SoC SATA and CAN node support, while HDMI received a 31.5 MHz clock for RK356x and a 16-bit audio fix for RK3576. Rockchip wireless work includes WPA3/SAE handling in bcmdhd and backported rtw88 support for rtl8723bs. Amlogic saw multiple meson64 VDEC fixes for H.264, MPEG-1/2, and GStreamer/FFmpeg start failures, and Sophgo SG2000 gained H.264 encoder and JPEG unit support in coda.

#Armbian #EmbeddedLinux #Rockchip #UBoot #SBC

Changes

27 October, 2026 02:40AM by Michael Robinson

hackergotchi for Deepin

Deepin

Keeping Pace with Upstream Kernel Development: deepin Releases Community Preview of Linux Kernel 7.3

The Linux 7.3 kernel was officially released on October 19, and the deepin community has completed adaptation. An early-access build is now available to community users. This kernel is a community technical preview and will not yet be pushed automatically as an official system update. It carries the latest upstream hardware support and performance optimization results, allowing technology enthusiasts to learn about new kernel features as soon as possible.   Kernel Update: Advances in Both Performance and Hardware Support The Linux 7.3.0 kernel brings multiple underlying capability upgrades, with optimizations across hardware compatibility, scheduling efficiency, file systems, and kernel configuration: ...Read more

27 October, 2026 02:05AM by xiaofei

October 24, 2026

hackergotchi for Whonix

Whonix

Whonix 18.2.4.2 - Point Release!

Download

(What is a point release?)


Upgrade

Alternatively, an in-place release upgrade is possible using the Whonix repository.


This release would not have been possible without the numerous supporters of Whonix!


Please Donate!


Please Contribute!


Security Vulnerability Fixes

Major Changes


Full difference of all changes

https://github.com/Whonix/derivative-maker/compare/18.2.1.9-developers-only…18.2.4.1-developers-only

3 posts - 1 participant

Read full topic

24 October, 2026 04:40PM by Patrick

October 23, 2026

hackergotchi for Deepin

Deepin

Treeland (Part 4) : Evolution in Progress | Visible experiences, combined with an invisible foundation, ensure that Treeland continues to advance on an ever-firmer footing.

This is Part 4 of Treeland: Evolution in Progress. Part 1 described perceptible upgrades: improved window behaviour, natural gestures and refined multitasking animations. Part 2 covered application compatibility for games, 3D software and X11 / Wine programs. Part 3 addressed less-visible stability enhancements. Over recent months Treeland has resolved crash-inducing defects, strengthening multi-monitor handling, input focus, Alt+Tab and file drag-and-drop reliability. Collectively these deliver a more usable and stable Treeland. Several fundamental questions remain unanswered: how do these improvements materialize? How can Treeland continuously gain new desktop capabilities and resolve defects? The answers lie deep within invisible technical foundations. This article explores ongoing evolution in Treeland's underlying architecture. Treeland is a display server developed by the deepin community based on the Wayland protocol. It uses wlroots as its foundational Wayland library without modifying the wlroots source ...Read more

23 October, 2026 04:04AM by xiaofei

hackergotchi for Tails

Tails

Tails 7.15.1

This release is an emergency release to remove a compromised certificate authority.

Changes and updates

  • Update Tor Browser to 15.0.26, which fixes CVE-2026-113470.

    On October 17, Mozilla blocked the certificates of eMudhra, a certificate authority that had its intermediate certificates compromised. Tor Browser 15.0.26 now blocks all eMudhra certificates as well.

    Using one of the compromised intermediate certificates, an attacker could impersonate any website, even if the connection is secured with HTTPS.

    This attack could be performed by a Tor exit node, the Internet service provider of an exit node, or a government. Onion sites are not vulnerable.

    We are not aware of this attack being used by exit nodes so far.

  • Update the certificate authorities to block all eMudhra certificates in other applications.

    In addition to Tor Browser, other applications rely on the certificate authorities included in Tails with the ca-certificates Debian package to secure their connections.

Get Tails 7.15.1

To upgrade your Tails USB stick and keep your Persistent Storage

  • Automatic upgrades are available from Tails 7.0 or later to 7.15.1.

  • If you cannot do an automatic upgrade or if Tails fails to start after an automatic upgrade, please try to do a manual upgrade.

To install Tails 7.15.1 on a new USB stick

Follow our installation instructions.

The Persistent Storage on the USB stick will be lost if you install instead of upgrading.

To download only

If you don't need installation or upgrade instructions, you can download Tails 7.15.1 directly:

23 October, 2026 12:00AM

hackergotchi for BunsenLabs Linux

BunsenLabs Linux

PHP vulnerabilities

Most members will already know that critical vulnerabilities have been found in php, the scripting language used in many websites. It's been top news everywhere. Vulnerabilities: CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619

Debian patches have already been applied in Trixie and Bookworm Security:
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tra … age/php8.4

Many older versions of php have also had fixes backported.

Regular BunsenLabs Carbon and Boron users should run the usual apt update and upgrade commands to make sure that their packages are up to date.

People running their own web servers should take care that any php libraries they are using have been patched for these vulnerabilities.

The BunsenLabs forum server has also been upgraded.

23 October, 2026 12:00AM

October 22, 2026

hackergotchi for ZEVENET

ZEVENET

Critical PHP Vulnerabilities: How SKUDONET WAF Helps Mitigate PHP2Shell Attacks

On October 21, 2026, the PHP project released fixes for two critical vulnerabilities, CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619, that can allow unauthenticated remote code execution. BBC News reported that security agencies urged organizations unable to patch in time to consider taking their sites offline, and that several public bodies did so, among them the Finnish government and the Dutch cyber-security agency.

Patching a whole PHP estate takes time: finding every instance, testing, scheduling maintenance. To cover that gap, SKUDONET’s engineering team has prepared a WAF ruleset, PHP2Shell.conf. SKUDONET WAF can help reduce exposure to the known PHP2Shell exploitation vector while you patch, but it does not replace the official PHP patches.

What happened

PHP 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36 and 8.2.35 fix both flaws. PHP’s advisory describes them as follows:

  • CVE-2026-109618: out-of-memory handling can interrupt PHP while internal request data is only partially initialized, and request cleanup may then treat that invalid data as valid.
  • CVE-2026-109619: request-owned internal state can survive after its memory has been freed, and a later request handled by the same worker may use it.

PHP says all installations serving web requests are at risk (PHP-FPM, mod_php, php-cgi, FrankenPHP and LiteSpeed), with mod_php the highest. According to the BBC, details of the flaws leaked on social media before the planned release, and Cloudflare reported seeing early attacks.

SKUDONET itself does not use PHP to process user requests, so Enterprise Edition and Community Edition are not directly exposed to this vector. The PHP applications running behind SKUDONET can still be vulnerable, and those are what the ruleset is for.

What PHP2Shell.conf does

The ruleset focuses on CVE-2026-109619, whose publicly documented exploitation path uses the PHP_SESSION_UPLOAD_PROGRESS field of PHP’s session.upload_progress feature. According to SKUDONET’s engineers, it cuts that known vector and reduces the risk from both vulnerabilities, but it is not a solution for either one. PHP’s advisory also warns that other exploitation variants exist, which a WAF cannot see.

The rules detect:

  • requests that include the PHP_SESSION_UPLOAD_PROGRESS field, the main vector;
  • known public exploitation tools, by their User-Agent and their characteristic multipart boundaries;
  • session file poisoning, where PHP code is embedded in the name of an uploaded file;
  • evasion attempts using malformed multipart requests;
  • session identifiers sent in the POST body, which bypass session.use_only_cookies;
  • HTTP 5xx responses after a multipart POST, as an alert signal that a PHP worker has crashed.

The WAF inspects each request in several phases: first the headers (User-Agent, Content-Type, session cookie), then the POST body, both parsed and raw so that manipulation does not get past it, and finally the response code. When it matches the field, the tool or the attack pattern, it cuts the request with an HTTP 403 before it reaches the application. The rules most prone to false positives are first left in log-only mode.

What has been tested

The team validated the rules’ syntax and logic and confirmed that they fire on known attack indicators. We have not run exploitation tests against a vulnerable PHP server, because that means running the exploit, so we make no claim of demonstrated protection against real attacks.

This is the ModSecurity log from a test request with the User-Agent php2shell-test:

Oct 22 10:59:14 ID13905 pound: test, [WAF,service be, backend 172.16.100.254:80,] (7efe5c4b36c0) [client 172.16.100.60] ModSecurity: Access denied with code 403 (phase 1). Matched "Operator `Rx' with parameter `(?i)php2shell' against variable `REQUEST_HEADERS:User-Agent' (Value: `php2shell-test' ) [file "/usr/local/skudonet/config/ipds/waf/sets/PHP2Shell.conf"] [line "17"] [id "99200100"] [rev ""] [msg "PHP2Shell Exploit: Malicious User-Agent detected"] [data "client:172.16.100.60"] [severity "0"] [ver ""] [maturity "0"] [accuracy "0"] [hostname "172.16.100.60"] [uri "/"] [unique_id "179265955471.271463"] [ref "o0,9v47,14"]

It shows the request denied with a 403 in phase 1 (header inspection). The Rx operator matched the pattern php2shell against the User-Agent header, whose value was php2shell-test. The rule that fired is ID 99200100 at line 17 of PHP2Shell.conf, with the message “PHP2Shell Exploit: Malicious User-Agent detected”. The request was for / and came from the client 172.16.100.60. This test covers the User-Agent rule only.

You can run the same safe check on your own farm by sending an inert request, such as a test User-Agent or an invalid session cookie, and confirming that the WAF answers 403.

Applying it

SKUDONET customers can request PHP2Shell.conf by opening a ticket with our support team. The ruleset is designed for SKUDONET’s WAF module: it is imported and associated with the farm that serves the PHP application. Before enabling blocking, SKUDONET recommends:

  1. Start in detection mode and review the logs for a day or two. Applications that upload files (WordPress, admin panels, file managers) are the likeliest to produce false positives. The deserialization and obfuscated-function rules can also trigger on CMS platforms or forums where users paste code.
  2. Confirm each application’s field and cookie names. The upload progress field name is configurable (session.upload_progress.name), and so is the session cookie if it is not PHPSESSID. If either was changed, the rules need adjusting.
  3. Make sure the WAF can see plain HTTP. It can only inspect encrypted traffic where it terminates TLS.

Perimeter filtering does not correct the memory flaw inside PHP.

What to do now

The WAF helps reduce exposure to the known vector while you patch. No mitigation can guarantee that it covers a given attack, which is why PHP’s advisory states that updating is the only safe choice. In order of priority:

  1. Update PHP to 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36 or 8.2.35 (or later). PHP 8.1 and older no longer receive updates from the PHP project, so check your distribution or LTS vendor for backports, or upgrade. The BBC also notes that PHP can be bundled inside appliances and third-party products, so include those in your inventory.
  2. Until then, set session.upload_progress.enabled = 0 in the server-level PHP configuration and restart the workers (PHP-FPM or Apache). Using ini_set() or .user.ini does not work, because the setting has to apply before the request is processed. PHP notes that this closes the confirmed session paths but not other variants.
  3. Keep the default IPDS protection rules active on every service exposed to the Internet. Many attack types, this one included, share well-known patterns that those rules already cover.

Need assistance securing your applications?

If you have questions about these PHP vulnerabilities or how SKUDONET WAF can help, contact our team.

22 October, 2026 12:09PM by Isabel Perez

hackergotchi for Deepin

Deepin

Urgent Security Update: eMudhra Intermediate CA Key Leak (CVE-2026-111943) — Upgrade Now

Dear deepin users and community partners, Recently, the private keys of 8 intermediate CA certificates from the public CA organization eMudhra were confirmed to be compromised. The flaw stems from an implementation error when the CA generated keys — the private key can be recovered directly from the certificate itself. Anyone who obtains it can issue 'legitimate' TLS certificates and code-signing certificates for arbitrary domains, and these certificates chain to root certificates jointly trusted by mainstream browsers and operating systems. This update involves only one software package, 'ca-certificates'. Please upgrade as soon as possible.   Vulnerability Details Vulnerability ID: CVE-2026-111943 Description: Of the 8 affected intermediate certificates, 6 are TLS issuing certificates (DV / OV / EV TLS CA - G3B, G3C), chained to 'emSign Root TLS CA - G3'; 2 are code-signing certificates (EM OV CS CA - G3B, G3C), chained to 'emSign Root CS CA - G3'. In addition, there are cross-signed copies issued by Sectigo and chained to 'AAA Certificate Services'. Impact: An attacker holding these private keys, if positioned as a network man-in-the-middle, can conduct man-in-the-middle attacks against clients that do not check certificate revocation status — forging arbitrary websites and stealing or tampering with communications. Because these intermediate certificates have no records in Certificate Transparency (CT) logs, browsers that enforce CT validation (Chrome, Edge, Firefox, Safari) are not affected; however, components that use the system trust store, such as curl, wget, git, pip, apt, cannot learn the revocation information and will continue to trust these certificates. This must be fixed through this update. Severity: Critical (CVSS 9.1)   Scope of Impact All deepin 25 users who have not updated with this fix. It is recommended to update and upgrade immediately.   Fix Progress deepin 25: 'ca-certificates' has been upgraded to 20250419+deb13u1, following the Debian Security Team’s approach (Debian Bug 1151413): removing the two affected root certificates, 'emSign ECC Root CA - G3' and 'Comodo AAA Services root', from the system trust store, thereby cutting off the trust chains for the above 8 intermediate certificates and their cross-signed copies. Please update via Control Center, or use the terminal command upgrade: sudo apt update && sudo apt dist-upgrade This update does not require a system reboot. Restart running programs to load the updated trust store.   Note: Removing root certificates will also affect other normally issued certificates under those root certificates. Some sites may experience certificate validation failures. This is expected behavior and is consistent with the upstream handling by Debian, Mozilla NSS, and others.   That’s all for this update. Once again, thank you to every deepin community friend for your support!

22 October, 2026 08:37AM by xiaofei

October 21, 2026

hackergotchi for GreenboneOS

GreenboneOS

Emergency Patch! PHP2Shell Opens PHP Servers to Remote Code Execution

Jump to scan instructions Download the PHP2Shell scan configs This post was last updated on November 11th 2026 at 12:11 UTC. PHP has released fixes for two critical vulnerabilities, CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619, dubbed PHP2Shell by researchers. Every supported PHP installation should be updated immediately. According to PHP, both flaws can allow unauthenticated remote code execution, […]

21 October, 2026 03:47PM by Greenbone AG

hackergotchi for siduction

siduction

Release Notes for siduction 2026.1.0 »Big Crime«

The siduction team is pleased to present another release finally. More time has passed since the last release than originally planned.

Traditionally, Big Crime was supposed to be released between Christmas and New Year. However, a lack of time among the team members delayed the release until now. The latest images are available for Download now.

What can you expect from siduction 2026.1.0?

First, a few words about the new artwork for siduction 2026.1.0, titled “Big Crime”. It was inspired by Neil Young’s song of the same name, in which he sharply criticizes the policies of the current US administration. The wallpaper was generated using ChatGPT AI.

siduction Editions

The editions we offer with siduction 2026.1.0 are KDE Plasma 6.7.4, Xfce 4.20, Xorg, and NOX. Unfortunately, GNOME, MATE, and Cinnamon did not make it into the selection because there are no maintainers for them within siduction. If you are interested or know someone who might be, please get in touch. Perhaps they will return one day. Of course, they can still be installed from the repository.

LXQt is currently not in a release-ready state. We will provide it later once it is ready for release.

The released siduction 2026.1.0 images are snapshots of Debian Unstable, also known as Sid, from October 18, 2026. They include several useful packages and scripts, a Calamares-based installer, a substantially revised CLI installer, and a customized version of Linux kernel 7.2.11, while systemd is at version 262-1.

KDE Plasma 6.7.4

We ultimately waited for Plasma 6.7 before releasing siduction 2026.1.0 “Big Crime”. This new major version marks a turning point, as it is the last major release of KDE Plasma to include an X11 session. Starting with Plasma 6.8, scheduled for release on October 14, Wayland will be the only supported display protocol.

Users who still encounter problems with individual applications under Wayland can switch to Xfce, which does not yet use Wayland by default.

A fork called SonicDE is currently being developed on GitHub. It can already be installed in Testing and Unstable, although we have not yet tested it extensively. If you have any experience with it, feel free to share your findings in our forum.

Xfce 4.20

Xfce remains true to its slow release cycle and, as with our previous release, is still at Xfce 4.20. It currently offers an experimental Wayland implementation, which has been further developed since its release. In addition, the Thunar file manager, among other components, has received significant improvements.

Xorg

As before, Xorg provides a way to build your own system based on a preinstalled X server. This currently still works with all the desktop environments we provide, but starting with Plasma 6.8, it will no longer work with KDE and LXQt.

Fluxbox serves as the window manager, offering an extremely fast and resource-efficient environment for the X Window System. This also makes Xorg a suitable starting point for users who cannot or do not yet want to use Wayland.

NOX

NOX differs from Xorg in that it does not include an X server. With the revised cli-installer (see below), installation on a modern UEFI/GPT system is now also possible.

cli-installer

For siduction 2026.1.0, the cli-installer has been completely modernized. It is included in all editions.

The main highlight is the integration of the systemd-boot boot manager, which is now available as an installation option in all editions. For users with straightforward hardware configurations, systemd-boot is a good choice.

The revised cli-installer guides users through the configuration process, suggests appropriate actions, checks dependencies and prerequisites, and provides information about the selected settings. The program can be canceled at any time.

With the introduction of Calamares as the graphical installer, the underlying fll-installer gradually lost importance. As a result, both the cli-installer and fll-installer had remained largely unchanged since 2018. Since siduction intends to continue providing a NOX edition, both installers required a fundamental overhaul to integrate modern features.

To clarify: While the cli-installer provides the user interface, the fll-installer is the actual tool working in the background that writes the data to the disk.

The most important changes:

  • Updated outdated commands, checks, and dialogs.
  • Non-free sources are now opt-in.
  • Full UEFI/GPT support.
  • Support for the Btrfs filesystem, including the creation of siduction’s standard Subvolumes.
  • Choice between the systemd-boot and GRUB boot managers.
  • Consistent user interface across all dialogs.
  • Removal of graphical interface components.

Btrfs Filesystem

When using the Btrfs filesystem with siduction, we make it possible to manage your snapshots with Snapper, a tool developed by SUSE. A dedicated chapter in the siduction manual under System Administration → Btrfs and Snapper, covers this functionality.

The Btrfs Assistant application has now been added. It is available to users of graphical desktop environments and replaces snapper-gui.

Excerpt from the siduction-btrfs documentation:

siduction-btrfs can be used on systems with either MBR or GPT partition tables, with or without a separate /boot partition.

Since version 0.3.0, siduction-btrfs uses the Snapper plugin directory.

When using the GRUB boot manager

After a rollback, the /boot/grub/grub.cfg file is regenerated in the rollback target using chroot, and GRUB is then reinstalled from within that target. This allows users to boot directly into the rollback target with a simple reboot.

All other Subvolumes, including the previously used one, remain accessible through the siduction snapshots submenu.

When the /boot/grub/grub.cfg file is updated during software installation or an upgrade, the grub-menu-title script adds the edition and Subvolume information to the default boot entry’s menu title.

When using the systemd-boot boot manager

After a rollback, the rollback-sd-boot script creates the boot entries, considering all kernels contained in the rollback target. The default boot entry is set to the rollback target, which is now the default Subvolume.

If a Subvolume with existing boot entries is deleted, those entries are also removed.

Snapper Snapshot Descriptions

After an APT operation, the snapshot-description script replaces the generic description (apt) displayed by Snapper with a more informative text.

Changelog:

siduction-btrfs (0.2.0) unstable; urgency=medium

  • Added support for systemd-boot.
  • Removed installation dependencies on grub-common and grub-btrfs.
    • Together, these changes enable a complete migration from GRUB to systemd-boot.
  • Improved snapshot descriptions in Snapper.

siduction-btrfs (0.3.0-1) unstable; urgency=medium

  • Rewritten to use the Snapper plugin directory.
  • Added support for a separate boot partition when using GRUB.

onoff

This small script replaces the removed init command. It restores the functionality of init 0 through init 6, which was removed by systemd 258~rc1-1, allowing users to change system states on a running system.

To switch to another system state, simply enter onoff, followed by the number of the desired state, in a terminal with root privileges. This eliminates the need to remember the longer systemd commands.

Non-free and Contrib

The following non-free and contrib packages are installed by default:

Non-free:

  • amd64-microcode – Processor microcode firmware for AMD CPUs
  • firmware-amd-graphics – Binary firmware for AMD/ATI graphics chips
  • firmware-atheros – Binary firmware for Atheros wireless cards
  • firmware-bnx2 – Binary firmware for Broadcom NetXtremeII
  • firmware-bnx2x – Binary firmware for Broadcom NetXtreme II 10Gb
  • firmware-brcm80211 – Binary firmware for Broadcom 802.11 wireless cards
  • firmware-crystalhd – Crystal HD Video Decoder firmware
  • firmware-intelwimax – Binary firmware for Intel WiMAX Connection
  • firmware-iwlwifi – Binary firmware for Intel wireless cards
  • firmware-libertas – Binary firmware for Marvell Libertas 8xxx wireless cards
  • firmware-linux-nonfree – Binary firmware for various drivers in the Linux kernel
  • firmware-misc-nonfree – Binary firmware for various drivers in the Linux kernel
  • firmware-myricom – Firmware for Myri-10G Ethernet adapters
  • firmware-netxen – Firmware for QLogic Intelligent Ethernet (3000)
  • firmware-qlogic – Binary firmware for QLogic HBAs
  • firmware-realtek – Binary firmware for Realtek wired/Wi-Fi/Bluetooth adapters
  • firmware-ti-connectivity – Binary firmware for TI Connectivity wireless networking
  • firmware-zd1211 – Binary firmware for the zd1211rw wireless driver
  • firmware-sof-signed – Intel audio firmware
  • intel-microcode – Processor microcode firmware for Intel CPUs

Contrib:

  • b43-fwcutter – Utility for extracting Broadcom 43xx firmware
  • firmware-b43-installer – Firmware installer for the b43 driver
  • firmware-b43legacy-installer – Firmware installer for the b43legacy driver
  • iucode-tool – Intel processor microcode utility

Removing Non-free Software

If you opted to install non-free software in Calamares but later change your mind, you can use the vrms (Virtual Richard Stallman) command to identify non-free packages installed on your system.

You can remove unwanted packages manually or use the command apt purge $(vrms -s) to remove them all at once, including their configuration files. Our remove-nonfree script achieves the same result.

Installation Notes and Known Issues

If you want to reuse an existing home partition (or another data partition), you should configure this after installation rather than in the Calamares installer.

On some devices with Intel GPUs, the live system may freeze shortly after booting. To resolve this issue, set the kernel parameter intel_iommu=igfx_off before booting again.

Credits for siduction 2026.1.0

Core Team:

Torsten Wohlfarth (towo)

Hendrik Lehmbruch (hendrikL)

Axel Konrad (akli)

Vinzenz Vietzke (vinzv)

Ferdinand Thommes (devil)

Server & Hosting:

Stefan (sla)

Former Contributors:

Alf Gaida (agaida) (eaten by the cat)

Axel Beu 2021†

Markus Meyer (coruja)

Our Thanks Go to Everyone Involved and Our Loyal Users!

We would like to thank all of you, all our testers, and everyone who has supported us over the years. This release is also your achievement.

With this release, we would also like to thank the KDE community for providing an excellent desktop environment.

And now, enjoy!

On behalf of the siduction team:

Ferdinand Thommes

21 October, 2026 07:49AM by Ferdinand Thommes

hackergotchi for Deepin

Deepin

hackergotchi for Qubes

Qubes

The Star Labs StarFighter is Qubes certified!

It is our pleasure to announce that the Star Labs StarFighter is officially certified for Qubes OS Release 4!

The Star Labs StarFighter

The Star Labs StarFighter is a 16-inch laptop featuring open-source coreboot firmware, disabled Intel ME, up to 64 GB of memory, wireless kill switch, removable webcam, as well as extensive firmware controls for fan, power, security, boot behavior, and more.

Photo of Star Labs StarFighter

Qubes-certified options

The configuration options required for Qubes certification are detailed below.

Base Configuration

  • Certified: Standard (Intel Core Ultra 5 125H + 32GB LPDDR5X + QHD display)

  • Certified: Ultra (Intel Core Ultra 9 285H + 64GB LPDDR5X + 4K display)

  • The AMD configuration is not certified.

  • Warning: While both the QHD and 4K display variants will work, the 4K display will run at a lower resolution (Full HD) due to the absence of proper support for HiDPI in Qubes OS. While users can manually change the resolution to 4K, we cannot guarantee everything will work properly. For example, there are known issues with both UI scaling and full-screen video playback performance in 4K. This limitation may be lifted in a future Qubes OS release.

Operating System

  • Certified: Qubes OS 4.3.2 or newer (within Release 4).

  • Releases older than 4.3.2 are not certified.

  • You may choose either to have Star Labs preinstall Qubes OS for you, or you may choose to install Qubes OS yourself. This choice does not affect certification.

Storage & Additional Storage

  • Certified: All of the available options in these sections

Disclaimers

  • As mentioned above, while both the QHD and 4K display variants will work, the 4K display will run at a lower resolution (Full HD) due to the absence of proper support for HiDPI in Qubes OS. While users can manually change the resolution to 4K, we cannot guarantee everything will work properly. For example, there are known issues with both UI scaling and full-screen video playback performance in 4K. This limitation may be lifted in a future Qubes OS release.

What is Qubes-certified hardware?

Qubes-certified hardware is hardware that has been certified by the Qubes developers as compatible with a specific major release of Qubes OS. All Qubes-certified devices are available for purchase with Qubes OS preinstalled. Beginning with Qubes 4.0, in order to achieve certification, the hardware must satisfy a rigorous set of requirements, and the vendor must commit to offering customers the very same configuration (same motherboard, same screen, same BIOS version, same Wi-Fi module, etc.) for at least one year.

Qubes-certified computers are specific models that are regularly tested by the Qubes developers to ensure compatibility with all of Qubes’ features. The developers test all new major versions and updates to ensure that no regressions are introduced.

It is important to note, however, that Qubes hardware certification certifies only that a particular hardware configuration is supported by Qubes. The Qubes OS Project takes no responsibility for any vendor’s manufacturing, shipping, payment, or other practices, nor can we control whether physical hardware is modified (whether maliciously or otherwise) en route to the user.

21 October, 2026 12:00AM

The Star Labs StarBook Horizon is Qubes certified!

It is our pleasure to announce that the Star Labs StarBook Horizon is officially certified for Qubes OS Release 4!

The Star Labs StarBook Horizon

The Star Labs StarBook Horizon is a 13.4-inch laptop featuring open-source coreboot firmware, up to 32 GB of memory, Wi-Fi kill switch, integrated webcam cover, as well as extensive firmware controls for fan, power, security, boot behavior, and more.

Photo of Star Labs StarBook Horizon

Qubes-certified options

The configuration options required for Qubes certification are detailed below.

Base Configuration

  • Certified: Standard (Intel Core i3-N305)

  • The Plus configuration (Intel Core i5-1334U) has not yet been certified. As of this writing, we have not yet received the unit for testing, but we currently do not anticipate any significant barriers to eventual certification.

Storage

  • Certified: All of the available options in these sections

Operating System

  • Certified: Qubes OS 4.3.1 or newer (within Release 4).

  • Releases older than 4.3.1 are not certified.

  • You may choose either to have Star Labs preinstall Qubes OS for you, or you may choose to install Qubes OS yourself. This choice does not affect certification.

Disclaimers

  • As mentioned above, the “Plus” base configuration (Intel Core i5-1334U) has not yet been certified. As of this writing, we have not yet received the unit for testing, but we currently do not anticipate any significant barriers to eventual certification.

What is Qubes-certified hardware?

Qubes-certified hardware is hardware that has been certified by the Qubes developers as compatible with a specific major release of Qubes OS. All Qubes-certified devices are available for purchase with Qubes OS preinstalled. Beginning with Qubes 4.0, in order to achieve certification, the hardware must satisfy a rigorous set of requirements, and the vendor must commit to offering customers the very same configuration (same motherboard, same screen, same BIOS version, same Wi-Fi module, etc.) for at least one year.

Qubes-certified computers are specific models that are regularly tested by the Qubes developers to ensure compatibility with all of Qubes’ features. The developers test all new major versions and updates to ensure that no regressions are introduced.

It is important to note, however, that Qubes hardware certification certifies only that a particular hardware configuration is supported by Qubes. The Qubes OS Project takes no responsibility for any vendor’s manufacturing, shipping, payment, or other practices, nor can we control whether physical hardware is modified (whether maliciously or otherwise) en route to the user.

21 October, 2026 12:00AM

Qubes OS Summit 2026: Nitrokey sponsorship; last call for tickets!

We’re proud to announce that Nitrokey has joined as a Qubes OS Summit 2026 Silver-tier sponsor!

Nitrokey logo

Nitrokey is a world leader in open-source security hardware. They develop hardware for data encryption, key management, user authentication, network devices, desktops, laptops, and smartphones. Several NitroPads and NitroPCs are officially certified for Qubes OS.

In addition, with the conference nearly a week away and on-site tickets over halfway gone, this serves as our last call for tickets! If you’d like to join us in person, please see below for details.

When and where

Friday, October 30 @ 9:30 AM — Sunday, November 1 @ 3:00 PM (GMT+1)

Refugio Berlin
Lenaustraße 3-4
12047 Berlin
View on OpenStreetMap

Attend in person or online

There are three ways to attend the Summit:

  1. In person at Refugio Berlin
    • Requires a paid on-site ticket
    • Grants access to the hackathon (including interactive workshops) and any design sessions (depending on conference schedule)
    • Provides the opportunity to socialize, network, and mingle with like-minded individuals who are passionate about secure computing
    • Grants exclusive access to any non-livestreamed, non-recorded presentations (see below)
    • Grants access to attend presentations and participate as a live audience member
  2. Actively participate online
    • Requires a free virtual ticket
    • For those who are presenting remotely
    • For those who are attending presentations remotely and wish to ask questions or engage in active discussion in a live chat during the presentations
    • Does not grant access to the hackathon or any design sessions
    • Does not provide the opportunity to socialize, network, or mingle with like-minded individuals who are passionate about secure computing
    • Does not grant access to any non-livestreamed, non-recorded presentations (see below)
    • Does not grant access to attend presentations as a live audience member
  3. Passively view online
    • No ticket or registration required
    • For those who simply wish to watch the presentations via the public livestream and recorded videos
    • Does not provide the ability to ask questions or engage in active discussion during the presentations
    • Does not grant access to the hackathon or any design sessions
    • Does not provide the opportunity to socialize, network, or mingle with like-minded individuals who are passionate about secure computing
    • Does not grant access to any non-livestreamed, non-recorded presentations (see below)
    • Does not grant access to attend presentations as a live audience member

Note: As mentioned above, presenters have the option to request that their presentations not be recorded. If a presenter opts out of recording, there will be a “no recording” icon next to that presentation in the conference schedule. Only on-site attendees will be able to view that presentation. It will not be livestreamed or recorded for later viewing.

Conference schedule

The official conference schedule, including a list of sessions and speakers, is available here:

https://pretalx.com/qubes-os-summit-2026/schedule/

Become a sponsor

If you or your organization are interested in sponsoring Qubes OS Summit 2026 or becoming a Qubes Partner, please contact us at funding@qubes-os.org.

Code of conduct

This event is covered by the Qubes OS Project’s code of conduct.

21 October, 2026 12:00AM

October 20, 2026

hackergotchi for Purism PureOS

Purism PureOS

The First Step Toward Digital Independence: Why AweSIM Matters

The privacy movement often asks people to make significant changes. Switch phones. Change operating systems. Learn new tools. Adopt new habits. We do that too.

The post The First Step Toward Digital Independence: Why AweSIM Matters appeared first on Purism.

20 October, 2026 06:34PM by Purism

hackergotchi for SparkyLinux

SparkyLinux

SparkyOS on USB 2026.10

SparkyOS is a modern, portable, rolling Linux-based operating system, derived from various Linux distributions, designed for modern 64-bit UEFI computers and laptops. Thanks to a pre-configured IMG image, it requires no disk partitioning or traditional installation; simply copy the IMG image content to a USB flash drive and boot your computer from that medium. Read more about SparkyOS onUSB.

Source

20 October, 2026 01:02PM by pavroo

hackergotchi for Univention Corporate Server

Univention Corporate Server

Nubus Release Overview October: Higher Release Cadence, New Flexibility

With this post, a new format begins. Instead of publishing a separate blog article for every Nubus release, a release overview that bundles the most important new features of several releases will now appear at regular intervals. The reason is a change in release frequency: Nubus has been updated more often since September, both for UCS and for Kubernetes. Operators receive updates and security fixes faster and gain more flexibility in choosing which release to run in production.

Higher Release Frequency for UCS and Kubernetes

The release frequency of Nubus is being noticeably increased. For Nubus on UCS, improvements are available weekly via erratum updates and app updates. For Nubus for Kubernetes, a new release appears at least every two weeks. This significantly shortens the time it takes for security updates and other improvements to reach users.

At the same time, Nubus for Kubernetes now makes larger release jumps possible. Not every deployment has to follow every single release as previously intended. Customers can instead decide for themselves which release to run in production and skip several versions, provided the respective upgrade path allows it. Details on the supported upgrade path can always be found in the section “Upgrade path” of the respective release notes.

New Format: Regular Overview Instead of an Article for Each Release

With the higher release cadence, the reporting in this blog also changes. Until now, nearly every release had its own article. With a cadence of at least two weeks for Kubernetes and weekly updates for UCS, that would be neither practical nor helpful for readers. From now on, a release overview like this one will therefore appear at regular intervals, bundling the relevant new features of several releases. If you do not want to wait for a summary, you will find the complete details as usual directly in the release notes.

Highlights since Nubus for Kubernetes 1.22

Since the last release article on Nubus for Kubernetes 1.22, three further releases for Kubernetes, 1.23.0 to 1.23.2, as well as the corresponding erratum and app updates for UCS have been published. The most important new features at a glance:

Guardian is back, now based on Cerbos

The authorization component Guardian is part of Nubus again, this time with Cerbos as Policy Decision Point. The new implementation does not offer any functionality yet and is disabled by default (nubusGuardian.enabled: false), but it lays the foundation for fine-grained authorization in upcoming Nubus releases. It is part of Nubus for Kubernetes and available under UCS as an app in the App Center.

Keycloak container hardened and updated

The main Keycloak container now mounts its volumes predominantly read-only. This reduces the attack surface, as significantly fewer paths in the container are writable at runtime. With Nubus for Kubernetes 1.23.1 and via the update of the app for UCS, Keycloak is also upgraded to version 26.7.4, thereby closing a larger number of CVEs.

Keycloak: preparation for stricter audience mappers (1.23.2)

Future Keycloak releases (from 26.7.5 onward) will change their behavior by ignoring OIDC audience mappers that refer to a non-existent or disabled client ID. Nubus for Kubernetes 1.23.2 and the UCS erratum updates of “univention-keycloak” prepare deployments for this change and correct the audience mapper of the OIDC client for UMC. Operators are advised to check all existing OIDC clients after the update using a supplied script and to repair them if necessary, so that the next Keycloak update proceeds without surprises. The instructions can be found in the release notes.

2FA Helpdesk: faster management UI (1.23.2)

The performance of the management UI of the 2FA Helpdesk has been improved. This is especially noticeable in environments with many user accounts.

Portal shows display names instead of usernames

Under Kubernetes, the right sidebar of the portal now displays the display name for logged-in users and only falls back to the username if no display name is set. This change will become available for UCS in an upcoming update.

Significantly smaller container images: less storage, smaller attack surface

The container images of the LDAP server and the provisioning service have been consistently slimmed down. Unused software packages were removed from the LDAP server image, and the four provisioning components now run from a shared, minimal (“distroless”) image, the first image of this kind in Nubus. This image is around 90% smaller than the previous four images, and the number of included software components drops by 85% (50% for unique components). This saves storage space and bandwidth during deployment, reduces the attack surface, and cuts the number of findings in vulnerability scans, in particular false positives caused by unused packages. Operators who use their own image overrides for provisioning components will find the required migration note in the release notes.

 

As always, the release notes for Nubus for Kubernetes 1.23 contain all details, including the complete list of closed CVEs. The installation is described in the Nubus Operations Manual.

Der Beitrag Nubus Release Overview October: Higher Release Cadence, New Flexibility erschien zuerst auf Univention.

20 October, 2026 09:27AM by Ingo Steuwer